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Out of the Household: Master-Servant
Relations and Employer Liability Law
Evelyn Atkinson*
Over the course of industrialization, servants moved out of the
household, the site of both economic production and family life, and into
the workplace, a space infused with the ideology of free labor and freedom
of contract. In the process, they became employees, no longer dependent
on their master for care or subject to his control. Free labor ideology
dictated that employees be independent, self-reliant, and responsible for
their own persons, as well as capable of bargaining for themselves in a
competitive marketplace. This reconceptualization of servants proved both
a benefit and a bane as workers, employers, and the legal system
attempted to determine the scope of employer liability in the increasingly
accident-prone industrial workplace.
This Article maps the transformation of servants from household
dependents to independent employees, exploring how elements of both the
traditional master-servant relationship and emerging employer liability
law influenced nineteenth-century workplace relations. The move of
servants out of the household and into the workplace took place against
the emerging ideology of the family/market dichotomy as well as the
related philosophy of free labor and freedom of contract. However, even
as the workplace relation began to be expressed in law through the rhetoric
of free will, the reality of workplace interaction was still informed by
traditional conceptions of master-servant relations. The disconnect
between interactions based on traditional household relations and the
liberal assumptions of classical legal thought produced inconsistent
treatment of workers in the realm of employer liability, in which workers
were sometimes treated as independent, self-reliant individuals, and
sometimes as dependent on the master for care and control. Ultimately,
* Harvard Law School, J.D. 2012. Law Clerk to the Honorable Nanette Laughrey, United States
District Court, Western District of Missouri. An earlier version of this paper won the 2012 Irving
Oberman Memorial Award Writing Prize in Law & Society. The author thanks Janet Halley, Jeannie
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vestiges of the traditional relationship re-emerged in the form of workers'
compensation. The rhetoric of separate spheres-the home as altruistic
sanctuary for wives and children, and the market as the brutal battlefield
of workmen-was instrumental in shaping advocates' arguments in favor
of workers' compensation. Yet in utilizing this rhetoric to promote labor
reform, workers positioned themselves in an intermediate space, with one
foot in the market, as the breadwinners of their own households, and the
other in the family, as the dependents of their employers. This Article will
show how the tensions between the traditional conception of the servant as
dependent and the free labor ideal of the worker as self-reliant influenced
workplace relations, specifically in the realm of employer liability for
workplace injury. Ultimately, elements of the household were transformed
and remolded to fit within the parameters of the industrialized workplace,
institutionalizing workers' dependence on their employers in the form of
workers' compensation.
Although much has been written about nineteenth-century master-
servant law and employer liability, this Article is the first to look at the
transformation of master-servant relations in light of the household's split
into home and workplace. It provides another avenue for deconstructing
the family/market dichotomy and challenging the traditional history of a
steady progression from status hierarchies to individual rights.' Part I of
this Article examines how over the course of industrialization, servants
ceased to be conceptualized as members of the household, the site of both
economic production and family life, and were newly understood as
independent participants in the workplace, a space infused with the
ideology of free labor and freedom of contract. Yet even as free labor
ideology dictated that workers be independent, self-reliant, and
responsible for their own persons, the reality of workplace interaction
continued to be informed by traditional conceptions of master-servant
relations. Part II focuses on the servant's right to bodily integrity (the right
to exercise control over and responsibility for one's person) as juxtaposed
with the master's right to chastise and duty to maintain, as an example of
how the nineteenth-century legal regime reconceptualized servants as
independent owners of their labor in a competitive marketplace rather than
members of their master's family, entitled to his protection and care. Part
III looks at how the tension between traditional master-servant relations
and the emerging ideology of free labor and freedom of contract
influenced the development of employer liability law. Part IV reviews the
practices of three manufacturing companies and their employees to show
1. See Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that Grows": Toward a History of
Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 867-69; Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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that both traditional conceptions of master-servant relations and
contemporary accident liability law influenced workplace negotiations
over compensation for injury, creating unsatisfactory resolutions of
compensation issues and increasing the desire for a new system of
compensation on the part of both employers and workers. Finally, Part V
discusses how the competing ideologies of the household and free labor
coalesced in the early twentieth century in the form of workmen's
compensation laws. Workers' compensation laws depended significantly
on the invocation of the ideology of separate spheres and workers'
independent manhood, with the result that workmen became legally the
dependents of their employers even as they framed themselves as masters
of their own dependents.
In other words, employees never shook free of the household, in the
sense of becoming the ideal free laborer of classical legal thought;
although male workers successfully asserted an identity as independent
actors vis-a-vis their own families, they did not become the independent,
self-reliant, and personally responsible market actors of free labor
ideology. Rather, through the legally imposed structure of workers'
compensation, employees forsook certain rights of the ideal market actor
in exchange for economic dependency and security. This Article's analysis
provides a new avenue for challenging the accepted understanding of the
home/market dichotomy and indicates that the distinction between the
family and the workplace may be muddier than is commonly believed.
I. OUT FROM UNDER HOUSEHOLD GOVERNMENT
A. From Household to Market
To situate the inquiry in context, this Part will provide a brief overview
of the master-servant relationship that existed in early modem England
and the United States.
Medieval master-servant relations were codified in two statutes: the
Statute of Laborers (1349) and the Statute of Artificers (1563). The
English government enacted the Statute of Laborers in 1349 in response to
the labor shortages and corresponding spike in wages after the Black
Plague.2 This statute and its later amendments were designed to codify and
preserve customary master-servant relations.3 The statute set wages at pre-
2. MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 4647, 51 (1989); KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND
LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 37-38 (1991); ROBERT STEINFELD, THE INVENTION
OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE,
1350-1870, at 22-24 (2002).
3. LINDER, supra note 2, at 4647.
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Plague rates, enabled the master to compel the labor of his servants, and
criminalized noncompliance.4 The Statute of Artificers, enacted two
centuries later, performed a similar function, setting local wage rates,
limiting the mobility of servants, and leveling penalties for masters or
servants who ended the employment relationship before the term expired.5
These statutes granted local magistrates or justices of the peace the
authority to hear complaints between masters and servants and to enforce
the laws.6 The laws distinguished between several kinds of adult workers:
servants in husbandry, hired by the year; artificers, hired by the task or by
the year; and day laborers, hired by the day or for a specified period, like
harvest.'
"Household government," in which the master of the household
exercised "domestic rule" over his dependents, including the "subordinate
relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves," formed the basic
structure of pre-industrial family and work relationships.' Blackstone
listed the master-servant relationship as one of the "three great relations in
private life," the others being the husband-wife relationship and the
parent-child/guardian-ward relationship, all of which were subsumed
under the heading of "private economical relations."' Each of these
hierarchical relationships within the household involved reciprocal rights
and responsibilities, including the duty of the dependents to obey their
master in exchange for his protection.'o In early modern England, the term
"servant" had several meanings. One meaning signified all those who
lived intra moenia, or "within the walls" of the master, including domestic
servants, servants in husbandry, and unskilled craftsmen." These servants
lived with the master's household or on his property. The term "family"
covered all those living under the authority of the household head,
4. DOUGLAS HAY & PAUL CRAVEN, MASTERS, SERVANTS, AND MAGISTRATES IN BRITAIN AND
THE EMPIRE, 1562-1955, at 64 (2004); STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 28.
5. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 64; STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 28.
6. LINDER, supra note 2, at 48.
7. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 7.
8. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 258 (Thomas 1. Cook ed., Hafner Press 1970)
(1690). The term "household government" was popularized by Henry Maine as part of Victorian
historiography's construction of the family/market distinction. See CAROLE SHAMMAS, A HISTORY OF
HOUSEHOLD GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 3 (2002); Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of
Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 312 (1994); Janet Halley,
What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part 1, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 8 (2011).
9. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *410; SHAMMAS, supra note 8, at 3.
10. Halley, supra note 8, at 8; Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations ofLaw and Legal Thought:
1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 32 (David
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); ROBERT STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 56-59, 64.
I1. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 7; ANN KUSSMAUL, SERVANTS IN HUSBANDRY IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND 6 (2008); CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, FREEDOM BOUND: LAW, LABOR, AND CIVIC
IDENTITY IN COLONIZING ENGLISH AMERICA, 1580-1865, at 356 (2010).
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including servants.12 The second meaning of servant was broader, and
included all those who worked for others, whether they lived in the
master's household or not." Although dependence on the master varied
with the type of servant, as Robert Steinfeld and others have shown, no
servants enjoyed "free labor" in the modem sense, as all servants were
subject to compulsory labor and specific performance if they failed to
fulfill the term of their contract. 4
The basic structure of household government was imported into the
British colonies. Some scholars have argued that the hierarchy of
subordination and control in the colonies was less strict than in England
because nearly every person in the colonies had been a servant at some
point; most immigrants to the colonies came as indentured servants, and
once they had served their term of indenture, servants could improve their
social position as members of the community.'" As in England, the master-
servant relationship was overseen by local justices of the peace, who could
hear complaints brought by servants against their masters and provide
redress.'" Justices of the peace enforced the reciprocal duties and
obligations of masters and servants, holding malfeasant masters to task
just as much as unruly servants.' 7 In Puritan New England, local officials
12. KUSSMAUL, supra note I i, at 7; Naomi Tadmore, The Concept of the Household-Family in
Eighteenth-Century England, 151 PAST & PRESENT 111, 117 (1996).
13. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 7; KUSSMAUL, supra note 11, at 6; STEINFELD, supra note
2, at 19, 41-45, 60; TOMLINS, supra note I1, at 356. Slaves were also considered a type of servant, but
the peculiarities of master-slave relations are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Paul
Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow Servants: Ideology, Law, and Industrialization, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
269 (1987); Gary Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641
(1988).
14. ORREN, supra note 2, at 13, 74-75; STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 40, 60-62; TOMLINS, supra
note 11, at 349-55; John Fabian Witt, The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace
Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467, 1481 (1998).
15. EDMUND MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 109, 132 (1966); Aaron Fogleman, From Slaves, Convicts,
and Servants to Free Passengers: The Transformation of Immigration in the Era of the American
Revolution, 85 J. AM. HIST. 43, 46 (1998); Carole Shammas, Anglo-American Household Government
in Comparative Perspective, 52 WM. & MARY Q. 104, 124 (1995); Christopher Tomlins, The Ties
That Bind: Master and Servant in Massachusetts, 1800-1850, 30 LABOR HIST. 193, 208-09 (1989).
16. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 120; 2 HENRY POTTER, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 304 (Raleigh, J. Gales & Son 1828); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 222 (Windham, John Byrne 1795); GEORGE WEBB, THE
OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 290 (Holmes Beach, Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons
1736); Christine Daniels, "Liberty to Complaine": Servant Petitions in Maryland, 1652-1797, in THE
MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 223 (Christopher Tomlins & Bruce Mann, eds., 2000).
17. For instance, Christine Daniels, in her review of servant complaints in Maryland, shows that
servants prevailed more than ninety percent of the time when they brought complaints claiming that
"their master had not acted responsibly enough as a family governor in one of three ways: by failing to
compensate them at the end of their terms, by abusing them physically, or by failing to educate them
properly." Daniels, supra note 16, at 237; see also MORGAN, supra note 15, at 117 (discussing how
courts would order lax masters to provide for their servants). Hay and Craven also discuss the British
system of servant complaints. See HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 89-90.
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also enforced good household government by policing household heads to
make sure they exercised sufficient control over profligate dependents.' 8
The master-servant relationship in early modern America was informed
by the traditional duties and responsibilities set out in the Statutes of
Laborers and Artificers, as well as by customary ideas of relational
dependency and authority. In New England, the master-servant
relationship was informed by Puritan conceptions of the obedience,
reverence, and faithfulness servants owed their masters and the masters'
corresponding duty to provide for their dependents' bodily and spiritual
welfare.' 9  Early treatises on master-servant law detailed the
responsibilities masters incurred toward their servants. As with other
dependents like wives and children, it did not constitute assault for masters
to administer moderate correction to their servants.20 However, masters
also had the responsibility to provide for necessaries like food, clothing,
lodging, and medical care for their dependents, including servants.2 in
turn, servants were expected to obey their masters and serve them
faithfully.22
This traditional conception of master-servant relations was challenged
by Enlightenment ideas of free labor and free will in both England and
America, even as industrialization changed the site of the master-servant
relation from the household to the industrial workplace.23 The early
modern regime had viewed the labor of dependent persons as the property
of their master, and the labor of individuals as the property of the
community, which community authorities had a right to compel.24
Enlightenment political theory, exemplified by the work of Hobbes,
Locke, and Rousseau, challenged this conception by promoting an
egalitarian view of all men as individuals with certain inalienable rights,
including the right to control one's labor.25 On their view, the servant's
18. Shammas, supra note 15, at 117.
19. MORGAN, supra note 15, at 113, 117.
20. See SWIFT, supra note 16, at 221; WEBB, supra note 16, at 17 (A justification to assault
existed "Where Men have Natural Power over others, as Parents have over their Children, 'til they
come of Age, to chastise them for Offences, without Breach of the Peace," and "Where Men have a
Civil Power over others; as the Master hath over this Servant . . . ."); Daniels, supra note 16, at 225;
Potter, supra note 16, at 304.
21. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 66, 78; POTTER, supra note 16, at 304-05; WEBB, supra note
16, at 290.
22. MORGAN, supra note 15, at 113.
23. ORREN, supra note 2, at 25; STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 65-66, 100; Kennedy, supra note 10,
at 35.
24. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 69-73.
25. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 35; see, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 148 (A.R. Waller ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1904) (1651); LOCKE, supra note 8, at 168-69; JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in THE BASIc POLITIC WRITINGS 139, 144 (Donald A. Cress
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1987). Blackstone in his 1765 Commentaries attempted to justify the
English common law in the face of Enlightenment demands for individualism and rational systems by
[Vol. 25:205210
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position in the master's household was elective, temporary, and governed
by contract. Attempting to rectify the disconnect between the
subordination characteristic of the traditional master-servant relationship
and the Enlightenment view of free labor, John Locke wrote,
a freeman makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a
certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for
wages he is to receive: and though this commonly puts him into
the family of his master, and under the ordinary discipline thereof;
yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no
greater than what is contained in the contract between them.2 6
Similarly, Thomas Paine noted in 1776 that when men become servants,
they forsake certain rights for the period of their indenture and regain them
when their term of service is over.27
As a result of these challenges, the view that both the laborer and his
body are the property of the master, including the accompanying legal
doctrines of compulsory labor and specific performance, gave way to an
emerging belief that labor was owned by the individual, and could be
contracted out, performed, and ceased at will.28 When white American
workingmen claimed the franchise in the early nineteenth century, they
redefined the concept of independence to include not only property in land
but property in one's own labor as well. 29 Their independence was framed
in juxtaposition with the dependence of slaves, who did not own their own
labor, and also with married women, who were still subject to coverture. 30
As Steinfeld and others have documented, even the term "servant" became
anathema as connoting hierarchy and dependence. Steinfeld reports the
comment of the "help" of an American gentleman in the early nineteenth
illustrating how the common law actually upheld these principles. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 261-62 (1978).
26. LOCKE, supra note 8, at 258.
27. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 131 ("[T]he exercise of the right [of freedom] may cease in the
servant for the time he continues so ... because their interest is in their master; and depending upon
him in sickness and in health ... they stand detached by choice from the common floor; but the instant
they reassume their original character of a man and encounter the world in their own persons, they
repossess the full share of freedom appertaining to that character." (quoting Thomas Paine)).
28. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 155, 106-08.
29. Fraser & Gordon, supra note 8, at 315, 316 n.5 (discussing the idea of possessive
individualism).
30. Id. at 317. For instance, Seth Luther, a prominent labor activist in the 1830s, referred to New
England mills disparagingly as "slave mills" when arguing for a ten-hour day. Seth Luther, An Address
to the Workingmen of New England, in THE WORKINGMAN'S ADVOCATE 25 (New York, George H.
Evans 1833). The independence of white working women was also framed in juxtaposition with
slavery. For instance, American working women on strike in the late 1820s chanted that they could
"never bear . . . the shocking fate of slaves to share," and claimed, "As our fathers resisted unto blood
the lordly avarice of the British ministry, so we, their daughters, never will wear the yoke which has
been prepared for us." ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING
WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (rev. ed. 2003).
2013] 211
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century that "none but negers are sarvants."3 1 As part of this development,
forms of servitude that too closely approximated slavery, such as
apprenticeship and indentured servitude, were scaled back and even
condemned.32 Unlike slaves, workers owned their own labor; they could
alienate this property right voluntarily while still retaining legal control
over their persons. 33
The rise of the concept of free labor was accompanied by the expanding
ideology of classical legal thought.34 Classical legal thought centered on
the primacy of contract, agreements between autonomous, rational
individuals that could not be infringed on by the state. Under the will
theory of contract, the parties alone determined their contractual terms,
and the state generally could not interfere to mandate additional terms or
qualify existing ones.36 The exception was contracts that created a relation
of status, such as the marriage contract or early modern contract for
servitude.37 The focus on contract caused legal scholars of the nineteenth
century to distinguish sharply between relationships that were based on
contract, governed solely by terms set by the parties, from those based on
status, the terms of which were established by the state.3 ' As Janet Halley
has shown, the relations between husband and wife and between father
and children were refrained as purely status-based, labeled "private" and
"domestic," and distinguished from the public market.39 Henry Maine
famously described this process when he claimed,
All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of persons were
derived from, and to some extent are still coloured by, the powers
and privileges anciently residing in the Family. If we then employ
31. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 127; JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED
wORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 34 (2004).
32. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 139; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 35.
33. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 106. Juxtaposition with slavery was a theme used consistently by
labor advocates throughout the nineteenth century in order to argue for the rights of workers. For
instance, at an 1871 meeting of the Labor Reform League, a speaker argued, "The black slave was
liberated, the white slave should also be liberated-the workingman liberated from his present
condition." Labor Reform: Meeting at Cooper Institute ofthe Labor Reform League, N.Y. TIMES, May
6, 1871, at 8. The juxtaposition of wage labor with slavery was subject to much critique, however,
particularly by labor activists and abolitionists. See, e.g., AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 20
(1998); WITT, supra note 31, at 32.
34. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 33
(1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 208 (2006); WITT,
supra note 31, at 6; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 26.
35. KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 106-07.
36. KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 105; Halley, supra note 8, at 43.
37. STANLEY, supra note 33, at 9; Halley, supra note 8, at 34-35.
38. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 33 (noting that classical legal thought "sharply split family law
from the law of obligations (contract, property, and tort), placing it on the side of morals and politics,
rather than science and will").
39. Halley, supra note 8, at 1.
[Vol. 25:205212
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Status ... to signify these personal conditions only, and avoid
applying the term to such conditions as are the immediate or
remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the
progressive societies has hitherto beenfrom Status to Contract.40
This segmentation of family status-based relations from contractual
relations was aided by the emergent Victorian ideology of "separate
spheres," which conceptualized the home as a site of altruism and
benevolence distinct from the competitive individualism of the market,
and was premised on the division of labor by gender.4 1 However, the
question of where the master-servant relation belonged posed great
difficulties for this schema. In early modern Anglo-American law, the
master-servant relationship had, like the marriage relationship, been one of
status arising from contract, governed by statute and customary law, and
overseen by state authorities.42 Yet free labor and freedom of contract
ideology challenged the view that servants-or, as they began to be called,
employees-could be subordinate to and dependent on their employers.43
40. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (Transaction Publishers, 3d ed. 2002) (1866);
Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation,
75 J. AM. HIST. 471, 474 (1988).
41. CATHERINE CLINTON, THE OTHER CIVIL WAR: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 18-19 (1999); KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 30, at 49-50; Halley, supra note 8, at 45;
Barbara Laslett & Johanna Brenner, Gender and Social Reproduction: Historical Perspectives, 15
ANN. REV. Soc. 381, 387 (1987); Minow, supra note 1, at 866; Olsen, supra note 1, at 1520-25; Reva
Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2147-48
(1996). Women were considered captains of the hearth, whose labor was confined to serving as wives
and mothers, while men were breadwinners who entered the combative market in order to provide for
their dependents at home. This narrative was not true of many working-class and immigrant women,
who earned additional income by engaging in some form of wage work outside the home or by taking
work into the home. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 30, at 52; Minow, supra note 1, at 874. On the other
hand, men's specialized role in the public sphere cast the ideal free laborer as masculine and
inextricably linked the concept of manhood to success in the market. As Kessler-Harris points out,
"For his wife to be earning income meant that the husband had failed." KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note
30, at 51.
42. Sir William Searle Holdsworth, a British historian writing in 1903, explained that the Statutes
of Laborers and Artificers sought to regulate the master-servant relationship as a status arising out of a
contract, similar to the marriage relation. He explained that "the relation between master and servant
under the statutes, though contractual in its origin and in some of its incidents, gave rise, like the
marriage contract, to a status of a peculiar kind. As in the case of marriage, the relationship was
founded on contract, but the rights and duties involved in the relationship were fixed to a large extent
by law and not by the agreement of the parties." 2 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 462-63 (3d ed. 1923). Holdsworth went on,
The legislators of the fourteenth century recognized that the relationship had then come
to be created by contract. But the conditions which they prescribed for the formation of
the contract, and the manner in which they defined the rights and duties of the parties to
it, showed that they intended that the relationship should preserve some of the
characteristics of a status.
Id. at 461.
43. See Tomlins, supra note 15, at 198 ("This juridical conflation of all employment relations
with the more specific master/servant relation had the effect of transforming the latter from a legal
relationship founded originally on status into one created by contract-an essential element in the
burgeoning 19th century ideology of 'free labor."').
9
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Throughout the nineteenth century, legal scholars debated whether to
situate employees within the private household, as dictated by traditional
master-servant relations, or within the market, as commanded by freedom
of contract and free labor ideology."
As this Article will discuss, free labor and freedom of contract ideology
exerted a powerful influence on social and legal conceptions of the
master-servant relationship. Although Maine paints a picture of steady
progress toward contractual market relations, in practice the split of the
household into market and family was protracted and arduous. The
gradual percolation of free labor and freedom of contract ideology through
the master-servant relationship posed a challenge for legal scholars and
courts in the early nineteenth century, as they grappled with whether to
treat workers as dependent persons within a household or as autonomous
individuals in the market. The purpose of this Article is to map the
progression of this transformation and explore some of its key points of
tension, as they were manifested in nineteenth-century employment law.
Ultimately, it will show that servants never truly left the household; rather,
elements of the household-namely, the master's duty to provide for sick
servants, and the servants' dependence on their master for care-were
transformed and remolded to fit within the parameters of the industrialized
workplace through the creation of workers' compensation.
B. Mapping the Move: From Status to Contract
Prior to the nineteenth century, the market/family distinction was
unknown; rather, market activity such as farming or plying a trade took
place within the household and involved all household members, family
and servants alike. 45 Master-servant, like husband-wife, was primarily a
relation of status. Although the initial contract created the relation (the
hiring contract for the servant, and the marriage contract for the wife), the
legal and social rights and disabilities of members of both relations were
defined and regulated by the state, creating a hierarchy of authority and
dependence.46 Yet as American jurists shifted from relying on English
common law precedent and "natural law" to formulating the view that
44. This question was complicated by the replacement of traditional forms of household
production with industrialized workplaces. See Barbara Tucker, The Family and Industrial Discipline
in Ante-bellum New England, 21 LABOR HIST. 55, 55 (1979) (offering a description of how colonial
manufacturers "sought to maintain traditional work patterns" by mimicking the structure of household
work patterns and discipline in the factory).
45. Halley, supra note 8, at 8; Wrrr, supra note 31, at 52-53.
46. ORREN, supra note 2, at 38, 60-61, 72-74; STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 56; Halley, supra note
8, at 7-8, 11-12, 45. For in-depth discussions of the disabilities and responsibilities attached to the
husband-wife relation, see HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000);
STANLEY, supra note 33, at 9; and Reva Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives' Right to Earnings 1860-1930,82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2133-34 (1993).
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legal doctrine should be based on good public policy,47 they gradually
replaced the conception of the master-servant relation as status-based with
an ostensibly more egalitarian, "American" view of the relationship as
premised on contract. This Section will showcase the transformation of
servants from dependent family members to independent market actors in
the work of American legal treatise writers, whose framing of these issues
provided the foundation from which nineteenth-century courts approached
questions of employer liability for workplace injury.
The early modem view of servants as household members defined by a
primarily status-based rather than contractual relation can be seen in the
work of several eighteenth-century writers. Samuel Pufendorf, in his
commentary on Hobbes, situated servants within the household, saying,
"As the Husband and Wife (whence proceeds the common Off-spring)
make the principal Parts of a Family; so Servants come in for inferior,
secondary Members, to bear the Burthen of common Labour and
Business."4 8 Blackstone saw the doctrine of master-servant law as built on
"the property that every man has in the service of his domestics."49 The
master's property in the service of the servant was acquired by the contract
of hiring and governed by both common law and statute, just as marriage
was a transfer of the wife's person and property to the husband via the
nuptial contract.50
In English common law, the master-servant relation created a clear
hierarchy of power. English scholar Matthew Bacon described the relation
in 1793 as "Superiority and Power which it creates on the one Hand, and
Duty, Subjection, and as it were, Allegiance, on the other," in which
Masters had "Authority to enforce Obedience to their Orders, from those
whose Duty it is to obey them."' Drawing on English precedent,
Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Tapping Reeve defined the relation in
terms of the same power differential, although in more moderate terms. He
wrote in his 1816 treatise on domestic relations that "[a] master is one
who, by law, has a right to a personal authority over another; and such
person, over whom such authority may be rightfully exercised, is a
servant. At common law, this right in a master, originates in some
compact made with the servant . . . ."5 Like Blackstone, Reeve recognized
47. This move is documented in MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW
1280-1860, at 11-23 (1977).
48. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 614 (Basil Kennett trans., J.
Walthoe, R. Wilkin, J. & J. Bonwicke, S. Birt, T. Ward & T. Osborne, 1729) (1672).
49. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429.
50. Id. at *429-30; STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 70.
51. MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 545 (6th ed. 1793).
52. TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND
WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT 418 (Albany, William Gould, Jr. & Co. 1888).
2013] 215
11
Atkinson: Out of the Household: Master-Servant Relations and Employer Liabi
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
that an initial compact formed the relationship, but Reeve dwelled on the
relationship of authority between the parties that the contract established.
Yet only a few decades into the nineteenth century, the emerging
ideologies of freedom of contract and free will posed a challenge to this
status-based conception of servitude. One telling example of this tension is
Timothy Walker's 1837 Introduction to American Law. Walker, a student
of Joseph Story, noted in the preface to his chapter on Master and Servant
that "[t]he title of master and servant, at the head of a lecture, does not
sound very harmoniously to republican ears," and that "in fact servitude,
strictly so called, does not exist in this country, except in the case of
slaves."53 Then, revealing his own uncertainty about how to approach the
shifting concept of servitude, he continued apologetically:
But the legal relation of master and servant must exist, to a greater
or less extent, wherever civilization furnishes work to be done, and
the difference of condition makes some persons employers, and
others laborers. In fact, we understand by the relation of master
and servant, nothing more or less than that of employer and
employed. It is, therefore, a relation created by contract, express or
implied, and might properly be treated under the head of contracts;
but custom has placed it among the personal relations, and I shall
so treat it. 54
For Walker, the master-servant relationship was primarily contractual; yet
custom had located it within the domestic sphere. At the end of the
chapter, he returns to this quandary, concluding, "I have heretofore spoken
of the relation of master and servant, as one of the domestic relations; but
the view now presented shows that it belongs more properly to the
business relations. It has, in fact, very little to do with domestics, or
domestic life . . . ."' He applauded American law, in contrast to English
labor statutes, as "wisely abstain[ing] from attempting to regulate the
relation of master and servant," because
who does not feel that personal liberty must be a mere name,
where all the most common affairs and relations of life are thus
imperatively prescribed by law? . . . [W]e cannot fully appreciate
the value of our freedom, until we contemplate it in the absence of
those vexatious details of municipal regulation, which have been
elsewhere endured. 6
Steinfeld has noted how free labor in the United States was defined in part
by comparisons to the "less free" system of England, and this trend is clear
53. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAw 261 (1837).
54. Id.
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in Walker's treatise. For Walker, freedom is privacy from state regulation;
hence his concern about locating master and servant within the family,
where relations like marriage were governed by terms set by the state, as
opposed to within the market, where relations were governed by private
contracts. This concern about state involvement in private contractual
relations formed the basis for opposition to workers' compensation
statutes nearly a century later, as Part V will show.
The reconceptualization of the master-servant relation as purely
contract-based was solidified as the century progressed. By 1851, James
Kent could say in his Commentaries on American Law that "this relation
of master and servant rests entirely upon contract. The one is bound to
render the other service and the other to pay the stipulated
consideration." 57 No explicit imposition of hierarchical authority between
the contracting parties is mentioned.58 How far the legal system had come
in this transformation of the employment relationship is revealed in the
1889 edition of James Shouler's treatise, Domestic Relations. Shouler
drew heavily on the rhetoric of freedom and equality in discussing the
master-servant relation. He clearly found the traditional categorization of
master-servant with the household irksome, complaining that "we
constantly find an offensive term ['servant'] used in court to denote duties
and obligations which rest upon the pure contract of hiring. ... [O]ur topic
in this broad sense is not, if words mean anything, within the influence of
the domestic law at all."59 Yet because the common law classified it so, he
must as well.60 Shouler defined the relation uneasily as one of legal
authority and subordination: "The relation of master and servant
presupposes two parties who stand on an unequal footing in their mutual
dealings; yet not naturally so, as in other domestic relations, nor
necessarily because the subordinate is wanting in either years or
discretion."61 Rather, the inequality of the relationship was a remnant of
ancient times, "hostile to the genius of free institutions" and bearing "the
marks of social caste."62 In those bleaker days and particularly in England,
57. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 289-90 (9th ed., Little, Brown, & Co.
1851) (1827).
58. This move toward contract was also adopted in England, albeit tempered by statutory
regulation of the employment relationship. English scholar John MacDonnell noted in his 1883 treatise
that although "laborers and workmen were not always free to make contracts with their masters," and
"[tiraces of serfage are said to be still found in the law of Master and Servant," the law now is that
"[t]he relation of Master and Servant is created by contract. Their duties to, and rights against, each
other arise out of contracts, express or implied. The only exceptions are duties and rights created by
statute." JOHN MACDONNELL, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 1 (1883).
59. JAMES SHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 690 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1889).
60. Id. at 690 (noting that "legal precision must sometimes be sacrificed to legal usage").
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"industrial legislation leaned decidedly in favor of the master. . . . [T]he
employer suffered rarely for his own misconduct besides rescission of the
contract."63 Against this backdrop, Shouler painted an egalitarian portrait
of how far master-servant relations in the United States had come from
their genesis. Because of the "fluctuation of Society in America, the
variety of pursuits always open to active competitors, the opportunities
freely afforded for social elevation,"64 "[a]s a general rule, every person of
full age, free from all other incompatible engagements, may become either
a master or a servant."" Although its roots were in the hierarchical
domestic sphere, Shouler comforted himself by portraying the
contemporary master-servant relation as one of equals. As an attorney,
Shouler was himself technically a servant; this perhaps explains why he
found it "gratifying to reflect that the servant is frequently the social equal,
or even the superior, of his master."66
What did the reconceptualization of the master-servant relation as based
on contract instead of status mean for the traditional rights and
responsibilities of masters over the persons of their servants? In spite of
the new rhetoric, servants did not fully discard their status as household
dependents. Rather, elements of traditional master-servant law
accompanied servants throughout their transition to independent workers.
As the next Part will illustrate, the legal benefits and disabilities of
workers' ambiguous status came to a head in debates over the extent of
workers' bodily integrity-the ability of workers to exercise control over,
and take responsibility for, their own persons.
II. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OVER THE PERSON OF THE SERVANT
A. The Right To Chastise
Within the early modern household, masters exercised significant
control over the persons of their servants. As this Section will show, this
control was eroded over the course of the nineteenth century. This was
partly due to the percolation of the language of free will and freedom of
contract through legal understanding of the employer-employee
relationship. It was also influenced by the solidification of home and
market into separate spheres, exemplified by court holdings that only the
head of a family could legally exercise control over and responsibility for
the person of his dependents, whereas an employer could not exercise such
control over his employees and was not subject to such obligations.
63. Id. at 692.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 702.
66. Id at 692.
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Like wives and children, servants in early modem England were subject
to their master's authority in exchange for his care, and had limited legal
personhood in their own right.67 In addition to the power to compel labor,
masters also exercised the power to chastise their servants in order to
punish bad behavior. According to Michael Dalton's 1618 treatise Country
Justice, "the master may strike his servant with his hand, fist, small staffe,
or stick, for correction: and though he do draw bloud thereby, yet it
seemeth no breach of peace" provided "hee doth it not outragiously." 8
Similarly, Pufendorf wrote in 1710 that a master may "correct [his
servants'] Sluggishness, by such Methods of Severity as are most likely to
prevail on their particular Dispositions; tho' he cannot, on this score,
proceed to capital Punishments."69
This practice was imported into the colonies and later incorporated into
the early law of the United States. Virginia Justice of the Peace George
Webb explained in 1736 that assault was justified where it was committed
by a man against his child or servant, and noted that masters could whip
servants who ran away. 70 Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Zephaniah
Swift wrote in his treatise on Connecticut law that "[a] master may
reasonably and moderately correct, and chastise his servant for negligence,
and misbehavior." 7' Nathan Dane, in his A General Abridgement and
Digest of American Law, referenced an act of Congress of 1798, which
"for the most part enacts common into statute law," and allowed masters
to correct their servants "by stripes."72
In return for the subservience of their servants, masters were obliged to
provide for the welfare of servants within their household.73 Included in
this duty of maintenance were necessaries like food and clothing, back
wages for the time the servant was ill, and medical care. 74 Both the right of
chastisement and the duty of maintenance were predicated on the
hierarchical relationship between master and servant. Free labor and
67. See STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 40; Siegel, supra note 41, at 2122-23, 2126; Stanley, supra
note 40, at 477.
68. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 78 (quoting MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE (1618)).
69. PUFENDORF, supra note 48, at 615.
70. WEBB, supra note 16, at 283. Similarly, a North Carolina Justice of the Peace wrote, "If any
christian servant shall lay violent hands on his or her master or mistress, or overseer, or shall
obstinately refuse to obey the lawful commands of any of them, upon proof thereof by one or more
evidences before any justice of the peace, he or she shall, for every such offence, suffer such corporal
punishment as the said justices shall think fit to adjudge, not exceeding twenty-one lashes." POTTER,
supra note 16, at 304.
71. SWIFT, supra note 16, at 221.
72. 3 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 597 (1824).
73. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 66; STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 154; Witt, supra note 14, at
1479 n.69.
74. STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 154. Steinfeld notes that masters were not responsible for
maintaining non-household servants. Id.
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freedom of contract ideology challenged this hierarchy, bringing the rights
and responsibilities incumbent on the hierarchy into question.
Adherents of free labor and individualism looked askance at the
traditional rule governing masters and servants, which allowed grown men
to be chastised by other grown men merely because of their status-based
relationship. A significant impetus behind this development was the
desire of white workers to distinguish themselves from slaves. Beatings
were a sign of subordinate status, anathema to the individual, egalitarian
conception of the free (white male) citizen.7 6 Enlightenment ideology of
control over one's person was first applied to non-household laborers, and
gradually spread to include domestic servants. By the late eighteenth
century, the right of employers to chastise was pared down to apply only
to minor servants and apprentices. 78 Blackstone wrote that "[a] master
may, by law, correct his apprentice for negligence or other misbehavior, so
it be done with moderation," but that beating a servant of full age was "a
good cause of departure."7 ' By 1833, the distinction between who could
and could not be chastised was fairly established. Following Blackstone,
Joseph Chitty wrote,
A master cannot, by way of correction, even moderately beat his
servant, or labourer in husbandry, or otherwise, as he might his
child or apprentice; and if he do, the servant may lawfully depart,
or obtain his discharge, by application to a justice, and support an
action for the battery.so
Similarly, English legal scholar Charles Manley Smith wrote in 1852 that
"no master would be justified by the law of England, even in moderately
chastising a hired servant of full age for dereliction of duty."' Smith also
engaged in a little historical fudging, noting that where Pufendorf,
Barbeyrac, and other writers of the past age "speak of a master being
justified in moderately chastising his servant or apprentice, they must be
taken to apply only to the case of a servant or apprentice under age."82
Treatise writers opined that chastisement had gone out of style. Based
purely on legal cases of the time, it appears that chastisement of servants
75. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 30, at 64, 67; DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER: THE
EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET
DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 18-19 (1993); STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 118-20.
76. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 23; MONTGOMERY, supra note 75, at 32-33.
77. See STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 152-53.
78. Id. at 137, 152-53.
79. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *428; STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 118.
80. 1 JOSEPH CHITrY, THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN ALL ITS DEPARTMENTS 73 (London, Henry
Butterworth 1833).
81. CHARLES MANLEY SMITH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 72
(Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1852).
82. Id. at 68-69.
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was also reprimanded in practice. The three cases below reveal how courts
dealt with the liability, in both tort and criminal law, of masters who beat
their (white) servants. These cases deal with the question of who can use
violence against whom in an employment versus a family relationship.
Judges in these cases draw the line between family and workplace very
starkly.
The early nineteenth century saw several cases in which parents
contested the right of overseers to discipline their minor children who
worked in the mills.8 One such case in 1832 involved a young woman
named Paulina whose father brought suit for assault and battery against
the mill's overseer after he allegedly beat Paulina with a leather strap.8"
The overseer claimed that Paulina was his servant and could be disciplined
like other members of his family.8 ' The court awarded Paulina twenty
dollars in damages, finding that Paulina's father had not delegated his
authority to chastise her to the overseer.86
A similar case, Matthews v. Terry, reached the Connecticut Supreme
Court in 1835. The case involved a fourteen-year-old boy who had been
hired by the defendant to help make clocks in a factory, and who was
horsewhipped by the defendant's employee for misbehaving.87 In the suit
for battery, the defendant argued that he stood in loco parentis to the boy,
and had a right to compel obedience through chastisement." He supported
this claim by referencing a state statute that required manufacturers who
hired minor servants to provide them with academic and spiritual
education.89 Yet the court determined that the manufacturer had no right to
chastise a minor servant. Drawing from Chitty's distinction between
apprentices and other servants, the court held that whereas "there is no
doubt but that, for just cause, a parent may reasonably correct his child, a
master his apprentice, and a schoolmaster his pupil," "[y]et that power
cannot be lawfully exercised, by a master over his hired servant . . . ."9 I
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that chastisement was
battery "whether that servant is employed in husbandry, in manufacturing
business, or in any other manner."9' The court also minimized the
distinction between minors and adult servants, saying, "The plaintiff stood
83. TERESA ANNE MURPHY, TEN HOURS' LABOR: RELIGION, REFORM, AND GENDER IN EARLY
NEW ENGLAND 13 (1992).
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id.at I1.
86. Id. at 10-11.
87. 10 Conn. 455, 456 (1835).
88. Id. at 457.
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in the same relation to his employer as any other hired labourer. Had he
been of full age, it would hardly be claimed, that he would have been
liable to corporal chastisement."9 2
The cases of Paulina and young Mr. Matthews are subject to several
interpretations. One interpretation is that by the early eighteenth century,
the identity of "servant" was so distinct from any identity associated with
the family that even servants who had other dependent statuses due to
gender or youth were nonetheless seen as located in the workplace, with
the protections of bodily integrity incumbent on independent, freely
contracting workers. Another coextensive interpretation is that these cases
were actually about which man had the right to employ violence against
children who were dependent vis-A-vis both a master and a different man
who was their father.
Both Paulina's case and Matthews were brought by the children's
fathers; as such they could be seen as a contest between one master (the
head of the family) against another (the employer). This indicates that as
workingmen gained recognition as rights-bearing individuals, they
asserted the prerogatives of the master over their own household
dependents. Seth Luther, a New England labor advocate of workingmen's
suffrage, warned at a suffrage rally in 1833 that there were "many females
who have had corporeal punishment inflicted upon them" in the mills,
mostly by "foreigner" overseers.9 3 The context of Luther's warning at a
suffrage rally is important-workingmen needed the franchise to
effectuate their transition to rights-bearing individuals, who could protect
and chastise their own dependents without interference from other men.
Workingmen's adoption of the role of master toward their own dependents
is a theme we will see reiterated later, in arguments over the family
wage. 94
Notably, in all these cases, the defendant argued that he stood in loco
parentis (as a parent) to the child servant by virtue of the employment
relationship. Violence against one's child, as a method of control and
punishment, was still acceptable. While these different facets of the master
used to be fused in the head of the household, industrialization forced
them apart. By holding that only fathers, and not father-substitutes like
employers, had the right to physically punish children, courts banished
violence from the workplace and isolated it in the realm of the home.
The policing of this line was very important, as the case of Jennie
Bailey reveals. This was a criminal case brought by the state of Texas
against the defendant, Mr. Davis.
92. Id.
93. Luther, supra note 30, at 20.
94. See infra Part V.
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Jennie Bailey was a young woman who, Mr. Davis claimed, had agreed
to live with him and his family "as one of his children, or as a servant.""
Mr. Davis, a sixty-eight-year-old man, had "talked vulgar" to Ms. Bailey,
telling her in "saucy and improper language" that he "wanted some."96
After discovering that Ms. Bailey had reported his comments to the
defendant's daughter and a young male servant, the defendant "got a
switch about a foot and a half long, and about as large as the point of her
little finger, and hit her three times with it."97 His defense was that she had
agreed to live as one of his children and be corrected by him, and that her
conduct in relaying his comments merited chastisement. 98
The court read the master's right to chastise very narrowly and the
definition of child very formally. It found that "Jennie Bailey did not
occupy the relationship of child to the defendant," and that "[i]f she
occupied the relation of a servant in the family, then we believe defendant
had no right to chastise her."99 The court also cited Chitty's claim that "[a]
master has no right to correct a menial or domestic servant otherwise than
by words and remonstrances."'oo Without dwelling on the implications of
Mr. Davis's sexual advances, the court obliquely stated that "she evidently
thought that defendant said improper things to her, and her construction
was a most reasonable and natural one to be placed upon his words.""o' In
the event that she had misunderstood, "the proper course for defendant to
have pursued, when informed of her mistake, would have been to have
gone to her, disabused her mind, and by words and remonstrance corrected
her."l 02
Mr. Davis had attempted to use violence (both sexual and physical)
against a non-member of his family. Unlike those of Matthews and
Pauline, Ms. Bailey's case did not involve the question of which
competing masters could exercise control; there is no indication from the
records that Ms. Bailey had a real father still living who would come to
enforce his sole proprietorship over the chastisement of his child. Yet the
state stepped in to enforce the sharp distinction between home and
workplace, forcing the court to explain clearly that violence could be used
in the home against one's real children, but not in the workplace against a
servant even if that servant's actual status was ambiguous and even if the
95. Davis v. State, 6 Tex. App. 133, 139 (1879).
96. Id. at 136.
97. Id. at 134.
98. Id. at 139.
99. Id. at 141.
100. Id. at 142.
101. Id. The court does not take the defendant's claim to its logical conclusion-that if indeed
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workplace was also the home. Perhaps the context of the attempted sexual
violence, as well as the physical violence against Ms. Bailey, made this
case particularly ripe for state intervention. Regardless, the involvement of
the state in this case of violence against a servant stands in sharp contrast
to the typical intentional absence of state intervention in cases of violence
within families. 103
These cases illustrate that servants' move from household to market was
influential in aiding the formation of "separate spheres"-the home
sphere, private and removed from the eyes of the state, under the authority
of the head of the family, versus the workplace, public and state-
monitored, governed (ostensibly) by rules of egalitarian interaction and
free will. Servants, as members of the market, not the family, could not be
subject to traditional trappings of dependency like chastisement. By
separating servants out from the family, the legal system hardened the line
between family and workplace, legitimating the use of violence against
family members even as it deplored the use of violence against employees.
B. The Duty ofMaintenance
Just as employers could no longer chastise servants, neither could they
be held legally responsible for taking care of the persons of their servants.
This latter point became very important in the context of workplace injury.
In early modern England and America, the duty of a master to care for
sick servants was generally accepted.'04 Dalton warned in Country Justice
that masters had a duty to keep their servants in service and continue to
pay them wages should they fall ill."0 s One of the first English cases to
discuss the matter, Rex v. Hales Owen (1717), involved a master who
discharged his apprentice when the latter became sick.o 6 The court stated
the rule in general terms: "the master is to keep the servant in sickness and
in health; and unless one or the other is guilty of a misdemeanor, the
discharge is not warranted by the state.""0 ' An 1857 English treatise on
103. As Reva Siegel points out, however, selective state intervention for the purpose of shaming
or discrediting the husband or father involved was a police tactic at this time. Siegel, supra note 41, at
2147-50.
104. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 66; Christopher Tomlins, A Mysterious Power: Industrial
Accidents and the Legal Construction of Employment Relations in Massachusetts, 1800-1850, 6 LAW
& HIST. REV. 375, 399 (1988).
105. MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 129 (London, William Rawlins & Samuel
Roycroft 1690) ("If a Servant retained for a year, happen within the time of his service to fall sick, or
to be hurt or lamed, or otherwise to become Non potens in corpore, by the Act of God, or in doing his
Masters business; yet it seemeth the Master must not therefore put such Servant away, nor abate any
part of his Wages for such time.").
106. Rex v. Hales Owen (1718), 11 Mod. 278, 88 Eng. Rep. 1038.
107. Id. The court's use of the phrase "in sickness and in health" reflects the marriage vow,
indicating the status-based nature of the master's obligation. See also Rex v. Christ-church, [1760]
Burr. Sett. Cas. 494 ("If the servant is taken ill by the visitation of God, it is a condition incident to
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domestic servants noted that it "may be observed that good and valuable
servants seldom find themselves without aid from their employers during
sickness."os In line with British master-servant law, early modem
American law required masters to provide for the care of sick or injured
servants, which would be administered by the parish church wardens.
Masters who did not provide necessaries for their sick servants would
have the cost levied against their goods or chattels.109 Masters were also
forbidden from dismissing their servants from work if they became ill.110
Yet by the late eighteenth century masters were contesting the duty to
provide medical care to their servants."' Several British cases set the tone
for distinguishing between moral and legal duties of employers to their
employees, the reasoning of which was then adopted by American courts.
One such case, Newby v. Wiltshire (1785), involved a servant boy who had
fallen from his master's cart during a visit to a different parish and injured
his leg so that he could not be moved. The parish officers sued the master
for the cost of the surgeon's bill." 2 The master's lawyer stressed that
"there was no express undertaking by the master" to pay for the surgeon,
and no implied contract either."3 Such an "act of kindness" as sending a
servant to the hospital was just that, not a legal duty.' 14 He also
emphasized that the master had paid the servant's wages for the entire
period he was ill, more than six weeks."' Finally, he pointed out that the
accident had arisen "from the neglect of his servant, who was wrongfully
riding on the shafts of the carriage.""' The picture that emerges from the
defendant's argument is one of two independent individuals whose
humanity, and is implied in all contracts. Therefore the master is bound to provide for and take care of
the servant so taken ill in his service."). Similarly, the defendant's attorney in Newby v. Wiltshire, 4
Dougl. 284, 99 Eng. Rep. 883 (K.B. 1785), referenced "the general practice of gentlemen sending their
servants to hospitals," while an 1829 English case noted that providing medical care "is often done by
masters for their menial servants." Sellen v. Norman (1829), 4 Car. & P. 80, 83, 172 Eng. Rep. 616.
108. THOMAS BAYLIS, THE RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND RELATIONS OF DOMESTIC SERVANTS 20
(London, C. Roworth & Sons 1873).
109. POTTER, supra note 16, at 304-05; WEBB, supra note 16, at 290. Masters were not the only
ones responsible for caring for sick or injured servants; the state also undertook this function via the
English Poor Laws, but with questionable results. See 3 RICHARD BURN, JOSEPH CHITTY, & THOMAS
CHITTY, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 238 (London, S. Sweet & A. Maxwell
1831); MICHAEL KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN
AMERICA 14 (1996); WALTER TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF
SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA (6th ed. 1999); William Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the
Poor in Colonial America, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 56 (1996). However, as these sources indicate, even
though poor servants might in theory be able to fall back on state resources for assistance, in practice
such assistance was not a secure alternative.
110. POTTER, supra note 16, at 304-05; WEBB, supra note 16, at 290.
111. Tomlins, supra note 104, at 396.







Atkinson: Out of the Household: Master-Servant Relations and Employer Liabi
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
interactions are governed solely by express contract. Any care provided
outside of the contract terms is merely from benevolence and not from
legal duty, and individuals who act carelessly should be responsible for
their own misfortunes. Although Lord Mansfield did not "applaud the
humanity of the master" for refusing to pay, he too distinguished acts of
benevolence from legal duties, stating, "In general, from humanity, and
kindness, a master should take care of his servants, but the question here is
what is the law . ... I cannot say that the master is bound."'"
The master's defense in Newby set the standard for denying the duty of
maintenance over the next century of workplace injury litigation. Relying
on Newby and other British cases denying liability, American courts held
that whatever morality might dictate, employers were not legally liable for
paying for medical care if such a term was not specified in the
employment contract."' For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois noted
that "where a day laborer has, by an unforeseen accident, been rendered
helpless when laboring to advance the prosperity and the success of the
company, honesty and fair dealing would seem to demand that it should
furnish medical assistance," but held that such a duty was not required by
law.'' 9
Courts debated, however, whether an express act of the employer or his
agents could incur a duty to pay for medical bills even though such a duty
had not been specified in the employment contract. Some courts held that
employers could incur liability by calling in a doctor or merely by
acquiescing in the worker's medical treatment.12 0 Yet others denied that
such liability existed, particularly where an implied duty of maintenance
would appear too akin to slavery. In an 1859 case involving an employee
117. Id. at 286. Other seminal British cases also dealt with whether masters had a duty of
maintenance. See Wennal v. Adney (1802), 3 Bos. & Pul. 247, 253, 127 Eng. Rep. 138 (stating that
"the humanity of Lord Kenyon [the Scarman judge] misled him" and denying the master's liability for
the medical care of his servants); Simmons v. Wilmott (1800), 3 Esp. 91, 170 Eng. Rep. 549
(distinguishing a master's duty between types of servants, and holding that a master did have a duty to
pay for medical care of a domestic servant); Scarman v. Castell (1795), 1 Esp. 270, 170 Eng. Rep. 353
(distinguishing a master's duty between types of servants, and holding that a master did have a duty to
pay for medical care of a domestic servant). Succeeding cases continued to deny the master's duty of
maintenance, with an exception for explicit acts of the master. When the master (or his wife) called in
a doctor for a servant, or made no objection to a doctor's attendance, masters were found liable. See
Cooper v. Phillips (1831), 4 C. & P. 581, 172 Eng. Rep. 834 (holding that a physician who attended
the defendant's child and servant with the knowledge of defendant's wife could recover the cost of
treatment from the defendant); Sellen, 4 Car. & P. at 83 (holding that "if a master, when a menial
servant falls ill, calls in his own medical man, I think he cannot afterwards charge that against the
servant's wages, unless there be some special contract between the master and servant, that he should
do so").
118. See Tomlins, supra note 104, at 397-400.
119. Cairo & St. L.R. Co. v. Mahoney, 82 Ill. 73, 76 (1876).
120. See, e.g., id. at 75-76 ("[W]here a surgeon has been employed by an agent of the company,
although he may not have had express authority, yet slight acts of ratification by the company will,
ordinarily, satisfy a jury that the employment was the act of the company.").
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who caught his arm in a machine and had to have it amputated, the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that the employment contract alone
governed the defendant's responsibilities, even though the defendant's
agent had called in a physician and told him the company would pay.12 1
Drawing a sharp distinction between slave labor and free labor, the court
dismissed the lower court's argument that "it was as much within the
business of the company to have its operatives repaired when injured at
their work, as it is to have the machinery repaired when it is out of
order." 22 Rather, the court proclaimed,
This would be the exact law of the case, if the company's
operatives were its slaves, instead of being free white men and
women . . . . But when the relation of employer and employee
exists between white people, the contract of the parties, is the
standard of their duties. If one white man employs another white
man to work for him, and agrees to pay his doctor bills, he is
bound to pay them, and if he don't agree, he is not bound.123
The relationship between a white employer and his employee was
governed purely by contract; to hold otherwise would put the white
worker on a footing too similar to that of a slave.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the contract-centric view had
taken precedence, and even employers who called in doctors for their
injured workers were not held liable for medical bills. In 1891, a Missouri
appellate court distinguished relationships where the assumption of
payment of medical care was proper from those where it was not.
Although the employer's agent had called in the physician to attend to an
injured mill worker, the court determined that the only time it could be
assumed that the person who called in the doctor would pay the bill is
when the "the relation of the person making the request to the patient is
such as raises a legal obligation on his part to call in a physician and pay
for the services."l 24 The court distinguished the act of the corporation's
agent from the circumstance "[w]here a husband calls in a physician to
attend upon his wife, or where a father calls in a physician to attend upon
his minor child," saying "no such implication arises where one calls in a
physician to attend upon a stranger, or upon one to whom he is under no
legal obligation to furnish necessaries."25 Servants were not included
121. Sweet Water Mfg. Co. v. Glover, 29 Ga. 399, 400 (1859).
122. Id. at 401.
123. Id. at 401-02.
124. Meisenbach v. S. Cooperage Co., 45 Mo. App. 232, 234 (1891); see also Jesserich v.
Walruff, 51 Mo. App. 272 (1892) (holding that defendant employer was not obliged to notify the
doctor he called in that he would not be liable for the costs, and that absent a special relationship, there
is no assumption of liability for medical bills).
125. Meisenbach, 45 Mo. App. at 234.
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under the umbrella of the household any longer; they were more akin to
strangers than family members, and the master owed them no duty of
maintenance. 126
These cases show the hardening of the line between the family and the
workplace and the courts' placement of the master-servant relationship in
the latter. There were still special duties of care that applied to the heads
of households, but the household was now confined to the legally
recognized family. For workers, this meant that rather than rely on their
employer for aid in case of injury or illness, they were now solely
responsible for their own persons. The presumption of no duty of
maintenance in the employment relationship had important ramifications
for employer liability law, as the next Part will show.
1II. NEITHER STRANGE NOR FAMILIAR: FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
IDEOLOGY AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY
The courts' denial of the employer's legal duty to maintain was
influential in the developing jurisprudence of the master's liability in tort
for the servant's injuries. Employer liability for workplace injury has been
one of the most commented-upon subjects in the legal literature;1 2 7
however, it has not been contextualized within the transition of the
employment relation from household to market and the segregation of the
126. The necessary family relation was read very strictly in an Iowa case involving a nineteen-
year-old who had grown up with the defendant, who refused to pay his medical bill. Holmes v.
McKim, 109 Iowa 245, 245 (1899). The court held that although the injured boy acted like a member
of the defendant's family, he "had not been adopted on paper," and the defendant was "not entitled in
law to [his] custody or services." Id. As in the chastisement case of State v. Davis discussed above, the
Iowa court interpreted the boy's presence in the defendant's household and the absence of legally
recognized family ties as determinative of a master-servant and not a parent-child relationship: "The
rule is that a master is not liable for medical attendance upon a servant, and that is the closest relation
which can be said to have existed here." Id.
127. See, e.g., JAMIE BRONSTEIN, CAUGHT IN THE MACHINERY: WORKPLACE ACCIDENTS AND
INJURED WORKERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (2008); PRICE FISHBACK & SHAWN KANTOR,
A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION (2000); ORREN,
supra note 2; EDWARD PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1992); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER,
RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 (2001); WITT, supra note 31; Robert Asher,
Business and Workers' Welfare in the Progressive Era: Workmen 's Compensation Reform in
Massachusetts 1880-1911, 43 BUS. HIST. REV. 452 (1969); Richard Epstein, The Historical Origins
and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982); Price Fishback
& Shawn Kantor, The Adoption of Workers' Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. &
ECON. 305 (1998); Lawrence Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Law in the Late 19h Century,
12 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 351 (1987) [hereinafter Friedman, Civil Wrongs]; Lawrence Friedman,
More Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury Litigation 1900-1910, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295 (1990);
Lawrence Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 50 (1967); Julian Go, Inventing Industrial Accidents and Their Insurance: Discourse and
Workers' Compensation in the United States, 1880s-1910s, 20 SOC. SC. HIST. 401 (1996); Blake
Keating, Historical Origins of Workmen 's Compensation Laws in the United States: Implementing the
European Social Insurance Idea, 24 WORKERS' COMP. L. REV. 135 (2002); Schwartz, supra note 13;
Tomlins, supra note 15; Tomlins, supra note 104; Witt, supra note 14.
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family from the workplace via the ideology of separate spheres. This Part
will situate the structure of workplace injury liability doctrine within the
foregoing analysis of the changing master-servant relationship.
In early modem Anglo-American law, servants, as members of the
household, could not sue their masters for damages as the result of injuries
suffered due to the master's intentional or negligent acts.128 If the master
acted wrongfully toward the servant, such as by withholding wages or
acting brutally, the most the servant could do was bring a claim before a
justice of the peace for release from the contract of servitude.'29 As the
employment relationship shifted from the home to the marketplace,
however, employees who were injured on the job attempted to sue in tort.
The appeal of workers to the legal system to remedy injuries suffered on
the job was influenced by a number of factors.13 0 Whereas under the old
regime, masters sued for injury to their servants under the theory that the
servant was the master's property, the reconceptualization of servants as
individuals with the right to own their labor and control their person meant
that they, not their masters, had the right to damages for injury to their
person. The assimilation of free labor and individualist ideology into the
employment relationship may have empowered workers to assert their
newfound right to bodily integrity through the legal system. The number
and severity of workplace accidents also increased dramatically as a result
of industrialization."' Shifts in conceptions of causality encouraged
workers and lawyers to view injuries not as "acts of God" but as human-
controlled events for which someone could be held liable. 3 2 Furthermore,
the development of contingency fee representation encouraged lawyers to
accept destitute workers as clients.' 3 3
As we will see, for a brief period at the beginning of the century the
American legal system entertained the idea that the traditional conception
128. Servants could, however, bring a lawsuit with the backing of their master. Blackstone noted
that although assisting a person in maintaining a lawsuit was ordinarily "an offense against public
justice," it was not so when the master chose to "abet and assist his servant in any action at law against
a stranger." I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429. Since a master could not sue himself, this meant
effectively that household dependents had no recourse in litigation against their masters. Because
married women had no legal personhood, they were unable to be sued except by attaching their
husband, except in cases of grievous criminal wrongs. Children were also prohibited from suing
except through their parent or guardian. Id. at *452-53.
129. HAY & CRAVEN, supra note 4, at 61, 67; STEINFELD, supra note 2, at 28.
130. The proportion of cases brought to injuries incurred was still quite small. See, e.g., KENNETH
ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO
9/11, at 41 (2008).
131. Wirr, supra note 31, at 26-27.
132. See, e.g., Arthur McEvoy, The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911: Social Change,
Industrial Accidents, and the Evolution of Common-Sense Causality, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 621,
626 (1995).
I 33. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor To Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1997).
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of the master's responsibility to care for his servant could be enforced as a
legal duty in the event of workplace injury. However, this view was
quickly challenged by freedom of contract ideology, which held that
workers alone were responsible for looking out for their own interests,
both through contractual bargaining and through the exercise of
reasonable care. For workers and employers, as well as other involved
parties such as legal actors and insurance companies, both the traditional
master-servant relationship and freedom of contract ideology provided
fertile sources for negotiating employer liability. Although the
conceptualization of the worker as an independent individual was helpful
in breaking down traditional boundaries that prevented servants from
exercising their right to control their labor and persons, it proved a double-
edged sword: the same rhetoric of independence and responsibility was
used to hold workers to an unreachable standard of autonomy and
foreclose meaningful opportunities for recovery in cases of workplace
injury. Similarly, the desire of white male workers to assert their
independence from employers, their freedom compared to slaves, and their
manliness compared to women dissuaded workingmen from appealing to
their employers for aid. The story of employer liability in industrializing
America reflects a mix of motivations and ideologies-benevolence
versus economic gain, freedom versus dependency, and communal versus
personal responsibility-set against the backdrop of the growing chasm
between the "separate spheres" of home and workplace.
A. The Emergence of the No-Liability Structure: The Fellow Servant Rule
One of the first cases to test whether a master could be held liable to a
servant for negligently caused harm was the 1837 case of Barnes v. Boston
& Worcester Railroad.134 Barnes involved a railroad employee who had
been injured while traveling to his worksite on a gravel car, which had
been outfitted with discarded passenger car wheels per the corporation's
policy. The plaintiffs lawyer contended that Barnes was a passenger and
so the railroad, as a common carrier, owed him a duty of care. Following
the British cases that held that there was no legal duty to provide for
employees in case of illness, discussed above, the defendant's attorney
countered that the railroad's duty to Barnes was established solely by the
terms of the employment contract. Yet the defendant's attorney also
argued that the corporation's legal duty was different from its moral duty,
noting that "[t]he defendants and counsel do deeply sympathize" with
Barnes, and did not "feel such indignation or resentment at the bringing of
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this suit that their sympathies are chilled or their generosity
extinguished."13 ' Rather, should the court rule against Barnes, the defense
stressed, "the door of friendly application for relief will still be open. "136
As Christopher Tomlins has discussed, the railroad opposed legally
imposed benevolence, but was perfectly willing to behave benevolently in
a system that maintained a hierarchy of supplication and authority between
servant and master.'31 It was the bringing of the suit, as if Barnes were the
employer's equal, which was the "indignity." Thus, even as the defense
argued for a purely contractual legal reading of the employer-employee
relationship, it assumed the existence of an extra-legal social practice
based on traditional master-servant relations. In effect, the railroad asked
the court to maintain the status quo: servants would have no legal right to
demand care, but would receive it through the customary practices of the
master. However, the Massachusetts court did not buy this argument; it
awarded Barnes three thousand dollars in damages. 38
Yet Barnes quickly proved an outlier in workplace injury cases, as
subsequent cases foreclosed servants' opportunities for recovery. Courts
developed three defenses to employer liability for workplace injury:
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule.139
Assumption of risk maintained that once an employee knew of the
defective or dangerous condition of the workplace, if he remained working
for the employer, he had assumed the risk of injury.'40 Contributory
negligence held that if a plaintiff had contributed in any way, however
small, to the cause of his injury, the employer was absolved, regardless of
how negligent he may have been.'4 ' The fellow servant rule stated that
employers could not be held liable for the negligence of an employee that
resulted in injury to a coworker.'4 2 All three defenses were motivated by
the reconceptualization of the worker as a freely bargaining, self-reliant,
and personally responsible individual, and their combined effect was to
largely prohibit employees from recovering against their employers for
injuries received on the job.143
135. Id. at 395.
136. Id. at 398.
137. Id. at 395; see BRONSTEIN, supra note 127, at 38-39.
138. Tomlins, supra note 104, at 402.
139. See, e.g., Friedman, Civil Wrongs, supra note 127, at 356-57 (discussing contributory
negligence and assumption of risk); Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 127, at 53 (discussing the
fellow servant rule); Keating, supra note 127, at 136 (listing all three).
140. See, e.g., Davis v. Forbes, 171 Mass 548, 553 (1898) (holding that the servant, a minor,
assumed the risk of using a defective strap after he had notified the employer of the defects and the
employer had told him it was fine).
141. See Friedman, Civil Wrongs, supra note 127, at 356-57.
142. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 127, at 53.
143. Witt, supra note 14, at 1468. It is important to note that in spite of the high barriers to
recovery, masters were not entirely exempt from liability. Rather, they still had a duty to supply "safe
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The adoption of these defenses was a case of "preservation through
transformation"-the practice of adapting legal rules and rhetoric to
changing social idioms, while maintaining a power structure substantially
similar to that of the old legal regime.'" The development of the fellow
servant rule provides an example of how courts utilized the language of
free will and freedom of contract to maintain the no-liability structure of
the early modem master-servant relationship.
A major source of workplace injury was the negligence of fellow
employees. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer could
be liable to those injured by the negligent acts of an employee. Respondeat
superior was a vital avenue for recovery in the nineteenth-century
industrialized environment, as it permitted passengers and bystanders to
sue corporations, such as railroads, when they suffered injury as the result
of the negligence of an agent of the corporation. Employees attempted to
use the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold their employers liable in
tort for injuries they suffered due to the negligence of a fellow employee.
However, courts refused to hold employers liable for injuries to employees
caused by their coworkers, creating an exception to respondeat superior in
the form of the fellow servant rule. Under the early modem master-servant
relation, household dependents could not sue their masters for injury done
them by other household dependents. The fellow servant rule provided a
clear analogue to this past household relationship. The following cases
reveal that although courts utilized the language of individualism and
freedom of contract to express the independence of workers, the joint
effect of workers' lack of bargaining power and the fellow servant rule
was to keep workers in a position of dependency while simultaneously
relieving the master of the duty to maintain.
The 1837 English case Priestly v. Fowler is credited as establishing the
fellow servant rule. Priestly involved a butcher's boy who had fallen from
an overloaded cart and injured himself. In articulating his reasons for
and proper" tools for working, to provide instruction on the use of those tools, and to warn against
unobvious dangers. See MACDONNELL, supra note 58, at 318; WALKER, supra note 53, at 267;
Keating, supra note 127, at 136. Several cases illustrate this rule. See, e.g., Toy v. U.S. Cartridge Co.,
159 Mass. 313, 314 (1893) ("It was the duty of the defendant, in the exercise of reasonable care, to see
that the machine on which the plaintiff was set to work was in a safe condition, and was suitable for
the purpose for which it was used."); Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572, 583-84
(1869) (holding that "an employer is under an implied contract with those whom he employs, to adopt
and maintain suitable instruments and means with which to carry on the business in which he requires
their services"); Spelman v. Fisher Iron Co., 1870 WL 7530 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1870) (holding an
employer liable for providing his employee with a new blasting powder without informing him of its
particular explosiveness). These duties were minimal, however, and generally allowed worker
recovery only in rare, particularly egregious cases of employer negligence, when none of the three
defenses-assumption of risk, contributory negligence, or the fellow servant rule-applied. Keating,
supra note 127, at 136 (discussing the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff and other factors that made
recovery against even a negligent employer difficult).
144. See Siegel, supra note 41, at 2119 (discussing this practice).
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denying the master's liability for the servant's injury, Lord Abinger
tellingly drew on the traditional conception of the servant as part of the
master's household. He stated:
If the master be liable to the servant in this action, the principle of
that liability will . . . carry us to an alarming extent . . . . The
footman . . . may have an action against his master for a defect in
the carriage owing to the negligence of the coachmaker . . . . The
master . . . would be liable to the servant for the negligence of the
chambermaid, for putting him into a damp bed; . . . for the
negligence of the cook in not properly cleaning the copper vessels .
. . ; of the butcher, in supplying the family with meat of a quality
injurious to the health; of the builder, for a defect in the foundation
of the house, whereby it fell, and injured both the master and the
servant by the ruins.145
Although several commentators have called Abinger's slippery slope into
household relations "irrelevant,"146 it is actually the clue to the court's
reasoning. Abinger's classification of a butcher's boy with a gentleman's
household staff, as well as with tradespeople with whom the master might
contract, shows that for him all persons employed by the master were his
servants. The distinction between work done in and outside the household
was not yet crystallized. Law that applied to one servant could be applied
to the rest; permitting recovery for any servant threatened to disrupt long-
established hierarchies of subordination and authority within the
household.
While Lord Abinger relied on conceptions of servants' dependent status
to justify a holding of no liability, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reached the same result relying on the language of free will
and freedom of contract. The court in 1842 adopted the fellow servant rule
in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad.'47 In this case, Farwell, an
engineer, had been injured by the negligence of a switchman.'48 Chief
Justice Shaw explained that respondeat superior could not apply because
"this presupposes that the parties stand to each other in the relation of
strangers, between whom there is no privity; and the action, in such case,
is an action sounding in tort."' 4 9 Yet here, the parties were not strangers,
but a "servant" and "his own employer," whose relation may only "be
145. Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 6, 3 Murph. & H. 305 (Ex. 1837).
146. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 127, at 54 (noting that Abinger, in his "diffuse and
unperceptive opinion," was "worried about the disruptive effects of a master's liability upon his
household staff," and that "these considerations were perhaps irrelevant to the case at hand, the facts
of which did not deal with the household of a nobleman, great landowner, or rich merchant").
147. 45 Mass. 49 (1842).
148. Id. at 50.
149. Id. at 56. Chief Justice Shaw's view of common law tort as a fallback in the absence of a
contract was typical of classical legal thought. See KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 208.
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regulated by the express or implied contract between them." 50
Chief Justice Shaw's reasoning rests on classical legal thought's
distinction between the purposes of contract and tort for effecting legal
redress.' 5 1 The focus on the primacy of contract dictated that where parties
were in privity of contract, the terms of the contract alone governed their
legal relationship. Where parties were not in privity of contract, but were
merely strangers, legal redress for injury was provided through tort. Where
the parties were neither strangers nor in privity of contract-that is, where
a familial relationship existed-the injured party had no legal recourse for
injuries suffered at the hands of the family member. In the traditional
master-servant regime, servants were located in the last category along
with wives and children, without legal redress for injury suffered at the
hands of their master or other household members. As the employment
relationship was reconceptualized as one based on contract rather than
status, however, the legal recourse for employees could be understood
through their contract with their employer. Because employees were not
strangers to their employer, tort law could not apply. Rather, an employee
could only recover from the employer for workplace injuries if such
recovery was permitted under the terms of the contract. This focus on
formal contractual equality obscured the actual inequalities of the
employment context, in which workers had little ability to bargain for
specific contract terms. The result was to effectively deny workers the
opportunity to recover against their employer through lawsuits, keeping
workers largely in the status quo-like wives and children, without the
ability to sue their masters for injury. Interestingly, as in Barnes, the
employer in Farwell fulfilled its customary responsibility under the
traditional master-servant relationship-it paid Farwell's hospital bills and
back wages, and provided him with additional compensation after he lost
the case.' 52
The Pennsylvania court in Ryan v. Cumberland Valley Railroad (1854)
went even farther in drawing the line between individual contract and
dependent status. As in Barnes, the plaintiff was injured while riding on
his employer's gravel cars to work, per their agreement.' Like the court
in Farwell, the court distinguished between strangers and those in
relationships "which must have their own rules, depending upon their
special character"-in other words, employment relations governed by
private contract.5 4 The court denied that the master had a duty of
150. 45 Mass. at 56.
151. See HORWITZ, supra note 34, at 33; KENNEDY, supra note 34, at 208.
152. Tomlins, supra note 104, at 378.
153. Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R.R. Co., 23 Pa. 384, 385 (1854).
154. Id. at 386.
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maintenance; such duty would imply that the relation was "substantially
one of protection, which cannot exist without implying the correlative one
of dependence or subjection. The relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, are in law relations of protection and dependence." 5 s Unlike
wives and children, the court emphasized, "[t]here is no relation of
protection and dependence between master and servant . . .. The servant is
no Roman client or feudal villein, with a lord to protect him. Both are
equal before the law, and considered equally competent to take care of
themselves." 56 The court determined that indemnifying masters would
"violate a law of nature," the independence of individual men, by "treating
[the servant] as incapable of taking care of himself."' This reasoning
reflects the myth of contractual free will in all its oppressive glory. The
court saw servants as clearly separate from members of the household,
who needed the master's protection; they could contract and fend for
themselves, and to establish a contrary rule would be an insult to their
freedom and independence.
B. Freedom of Contract and Formal Equality
Courts upheld the independence and contractual capability of workers
even when it was questionable whether workers had contracted with full
capacity and understanding. Edward McGuire, an Irish immigrant, was
injured while working in a textile mill.' According to his testimony, he
could not read or write, but in the hospital was presented with a release for
him to sign, and was told that it was a receipt for the present of two
hundred dollars the company was making him.'5 9 McGuire signed the
release, but later brought suit against the company claiming fraud and
deception because he had not understood what he was signing. "0
The court had no sympathy for this argument. "'[I]t was an
uncontroverted fact," the court said, that McGuire "was a man capable of
acting for himself, and who understood the ordinary transactions of life.
When such a man understandingly, and for a consideration, executes a
written release, it is a principle of law that his act discharges his cause of
action."' 6 ' Since no evidence that McGuire was incapable of
understanding the release had been presented, he was presumed to have
155. Id. at 387.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 387-88.
158. McGuire v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 156 Mass. 324, 328 (1892).
159. Signing releases in exchange for small amounts of cash seems to have been a common
practice at Lawrence and several other textile mills. See infra Part IV.
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understood it.162 The court also emphasized that McGuire had "brought
and prosecuted his suit without the intervention of a guardian or next
friend," and it was "to be presumed that he selected his own counsel."l 63
According to the court, in bringing suit McGuire had acted as an
independent, capable individual, and that if he had not "acted for himself'
in making sure he understood the release he signed, it was not the fault of
the company. McGuire was forced into the regime of freely willed
contracts even though it was doubtful his own contract had been freely
willed. Rather, because McGuire presented as an independent individual,
the court found as a matter of uncontested fact that he was capable of
understanding a release. Even though he may not in actuality have
understood it, his capacity alone was sufficient to hold his contract valid.
IV. NEGOTIATING IN THE SHADOW: CAPITALISM AND TRADITION
This Part looks at the insurance records from three Massachusetts mills
between 1887 and 1911: Dwight Manufacturing, Lawrence
Manufacturing, and Hamilton Manufacturing." These records are
composed of routine forms sent by the Mill employers (through their
agents) to their insurance company, American Mutual Liability Insurance
Company,'" regarding accidents that occurred on the worksite, and also
letters between the mills and insurance agents regarding any settlements or
suits between injured employees and the mill owners. Using these records
as a case study, this Part investigates how workers, employers, and the
other parties with whom they interacted (such as lawyers and the
insurance company) viewed the employment relationship. Certainly, as a
case study of employer-employee relations, these particular records are not
perfect; because they were communications between the employer and the
insurance company, the employee's view is only represented through the
eyes of another, sometimes antagonistic, party. Despite this drawback,
these records still offer a window onto the complex negotiations entered
162. Id.
163. Id. Interestingly, records indicate that McGuire's counsel, P.J. Hoar, represented a large
number of injured mill workers in Massachusetts, including from the Lawrence Manufacturing
Company. Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, Baker Library Historical Collections, Box GOI (on file with
the Harvard Business School) [hereinafter Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records]. Given this background, it is
not so clear whether McGuire independently selected Hoar, or Hoar actively sought out plaintiff
workers.
164. These records are available in the Baker Library, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University. The records include Dwight Manufacturing Company Records,
1832-1927; Hamilton Manufacturing Company Records, 1825-1917; and Lawrence Manufacturing
Company Records, 1831-1955. For more information on these archives, see Women, Enterprise &
Society, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/wes (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
165. Later in the nineteenth century, forms were also submitted to the Massachusetts Industrial
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into by workers and employers over compensation for injury, and they
reveal the continued vitality of the traditional master-servant hierarchy of
benevolence and supplication even in the capitalist, industrialized
workplace.
As this Article has shown, employer-employee relations were governed
by a legal framework informed by classical legal thought, including a
nearly exclusive focus on the formal doctrines of free will and freedom of
contract. Courts and defense lawyers were able to mobilize these doctrines
through the triad of defenses (contributory negligence, assumption of risk,
and the fellow servant rule) to portray workers as independent, freely
bargaining actors responsible for their own persons, which, coupled with
the realities of unequal workplace bargaining power, had the effect of
precluding recovery for workers. Even as workers themselves were recast
as independent, self-owning legal actors, these three legal defenses denied
them the legal recourse available to persons who were not in a contractual
relationship with their employers. This legal framework thus worked to
effect a transformation of the master-servant relation through a
preservation of one of its essential elements: inability of servants (now
employees) to obtain legal redress against their masters for injury.
However, the transformation of the master-servant relation into a
relationship of freely contracting individuals, and its reconceptualization
of the worker as an independent actor at least theoretically capable of
bringing and winning a lawsuit, provided workers with a new language
from which to draw in their negotiations with employers over
compensation for workplace injury. What the records below show is that
both workers and employers had two paradigms of their relationship to
deploy in the course of negotiations. On the one hand, they could frame
their relation as humble worker/benevolent master, avoiding the formal
legal regime to obtain compensation through a dance of supplication and
largesse. On the other hand, they could mobilize the threat and expense of
a lawsuit, which workers could bring even if they were unlikely to win, as
a back-up plan that would be pursued if informal negotiations failed, or as
an alternative to supplication altogether.166
Workers and employers did not negotiate in a vacuum, however; other
interested parties exerted influence on both sides. Employers had to
166. As Martha Minow and Hendrik Hartog have discussed, the actual social role performed by
so-called dependent persons may include more autonomy and power than formal legal restrictions
allow. Hendrik Hartog, Mrs. Packard on Dependency, I YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79, 84 (1989); Minow,
supra note 1, at 867-69. Their explorations of women in the nineteenth century challenge the
traditional view that legal restrictions on women reflected the way women of the time actually
experienced their lives; rather, women drew on their family roles to leverage their power and
autonomy in the market, such that their roles were "contested, made, and remade . . . in both practice
and rhetoric." Minow, supra note 1, at 867; see Hartog, supra, at 84. Workers and employers also
contested, made, and remade their stories of workplace obligations and expectations.
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contend with the insurance company, which was interested in saving
money for its insureds and disfavored settlement if the injured worker's
ultimate success at a lawsuit would be unlikely. Employers who wished to
effect a settlement with the injured employee had to convince the
insurance company that such a settlement was worth it. They relayed to
the insurance company their views on whether the worker was sufficiently
humble and deserving, and also whether the threat of a lawsuit was high.
Workers were pressured to bring suit from contingency fee lawyers and
litigious friends. Employers and non-English-speaking workers also had to
contend with translators, who extracted bribes from employers to convince
workers to settle, but would threaten to goad the workers on to suit if the
bribe was not large enough or quickly forthcoming.
Before delving into the archives, some context is important. In 1887,
Massachusetts's Employer Liability Law went into force.' 6 7 This law, the
first of its kind in the United States,'68 attributed liability to the employer
for injury caused by defective machinery or by the negligence of a
supervisor or railroad signal worker, provided that the injured employee
neither was contributorily negligent nor knew of the defect or negligence
and failed to notify a superior. It capped damages at four thousand dollars,
and permitted widows or next of kin to sue on behalf of workers who had
been killed.'69 Compared to later acts passed by other states, which
modified more vigorously the common law defenses of the fellow servant
rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, the changes in
employer liability effected by the Massachusetts act were quite modest.o70
However, the fact that liability was being increased per statute at all was
enough to startle employers into action; American Mutual began
operations on the day the law took effect.71 As the statement of the
American Mutual president in 1957 reveals, the company was created out
of concern that the Employer Liability Law would increase employer
liability for industrial accidents and put too great a strain on business
167. ABRAHAM, supra note 130, at 28; Charles Hodges, Seventieth Anniversary Address to the
American Newcomen: The First American Liability Insurance Company, Pioneer in Loss
Prevention-Since 1887, at 8 (1957) (available at Baker Library, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University).
168. Asher, supra note 127, at 455.
169. An Act To Extend and Regulate the Liability of Employers To Make Compensation for
Personal Injuries Suffered by Employees in Their Service, ch. 270, § 2, 1887 Mass. Acts 899-902
(1887).
170. For a discussion of Employer Liability Laws of other states, see JAMES HARRINGTON BOYD,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMPENSATION, FOR INJURIES TO WORKMEN UNDER MODERN
INDUSTRIAL STATUTES 8-9 (1913).
171. Hodges, supra note 167, at 10 ("Whereas [business owners] had taken care of their common
law obligations without outside help, they felt that this new liability was sufficiently uncertain and
requiring enough specialized attention to make the services of an insurance company necessary.").
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Under the tenets of liability insurance, the manufacturer had to give
immediate notice of any accident to the insurance company, and could not
compensate any person for injury without consulting the insurance
company first.7 3 The insurance company would determine if and for how
much to settle, and would defend the manufacturer in any litigation. The
insurance company was only liable to pay if the manufacturer would be
liable for the accident under contemporary tort law.17 4 Furthermore, only
select businesses could join the company,'75 and whatever they paid into
the association that was not used to reimburse accidents would be repaid at
the end of each year.'7 6  This gave the insurance company and
manufacturers an incentive to contest liability if possible. Because of this,
if an employer wished to compensate a certain employee for an injury, or
raise the amount of compensation the insurance company had offered in
order to effect settlement, it had to convince the insurance company that
this was necessary, either in light of the worker's particular worthiness or
the threat of a lawsuit.
The insurance forms are clearly initial templates in case of litigation.
They ask whether the injury was due to negligence and whether the
employer had any supposed legal liability. In filling out the forms, the
manufacturers overwhelmingly ascribed the injury either to an
unavoidable accident or to the employee's own carelessness. In explaining
whether the injury was due to negligence, the manufacturer's agent
usually wrote a variation of the following: "he was not exercising due
care," "stupidity on his part," "was undoubtedly careless," "his own fault."
If not the employee's fault, it was "simply an accident," "no blame to
anyone," "no one to blame-an accident," "unavoidable accident," "an
accident pure and simple."' 7 7 This reflects a type of causal reasoning rife
in public perception of workplace accidents prior to the twentieth century,
that injury was either the result of individual fault or "a mysterious
dispensation of Providence."' In the few cases where it was clear the
172. Id. at II ("[T]he founders were in complete agreement that their new company should find
whatever appropriate methods might be available to reduce or prevent losses . . . .").
173. Gilbert Hawes, The Law of Liability Insurance, 6 AM. LAW. 247 (1898).
174. Id.
175. The founders of the company agreed to carefully select "those who were to be permitted to
have their exposure to loss protected by the new company." Hodges, supra note 167, at I1.
176. Id. (explaining that, under the principle of mutuality, "income in excess of amounts held for
the payment of losses and expenses [is] returned to those who have paid the premiums").
177. Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box GO.
178. McEvoy, supra note 132, at 630 (quoting a tum-of-the-century New York Times article); see
BRONSTEIN, supra note 127, at 32-33. Reflecting this perception of limited causation and no liability
in cases of contributory negligence, when the employee was determined to be at fault, the
manufacturer's contribution to creating unsafe working conditions was ignored. A telling example is
the case of Katie Batton, a twenty-one-year-old Polish woman who spoke little English. Katie stepped
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accident was neither an act of God nor the employee's fault, either
because of defective machinery or the negligence of another employee, the
manufacturer's agent left the line blank or put a question mark. Only in
rare cases did the manufacturer's agent directly admit the company's
liability.179
In light of this understanding that the following records were written by
employers to their insurance company for the sake of reporting injuries or
discussing settlements, this Article will proceed to analyze the narratives
both employers and workers mobilized in the course of their negotiations.
A. Suing and Supplication
These records indicate that negotiation over compensation for injuries
was uncommon and that lawsuits were even less frequent. Of the
approximately two to three serious injuries per month, in comparatively
few cases did the employee ask the company for any sort of compensation,
and in even fewer did the cases end up in court.so Those employees who
on a splinter two inches long, and the wound became infected. The manufacturer reported that the
injury was her own fault because she was "going about work barefoot," and wrote to the insurance
company, "She, and her friends, claim that she wore a thick soled pair of shoes at the time,-but this is
hardly probable, as, practically, all the help in this room go bare foot." Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co.
Records, Baker Library Historical Collections, Box HLI (on file with the Harvard Business School)
(Jan. 14, 1899) [hereinafter Dwight Mfg. Co. Records]. There are several other reports of splinter
injuries in addition to Katie's. See, e.g., Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra, at Box HLI (Feb. 24,
1898) (noting in the case of a claim later settled for thirty-five dollars that "[w]hile she admits that her
shoes were not absolutely sound on the soles, she claims that the floor was in rather bad shape."). Yet
the manufacturer's contribution to the cause of these injuries through keeping rough floors or not
paying enough for employees to afford shoes was ignored. Expanding the causal chain beyond
individual fault would not become prominent until massive industrial accidents, such as the Triangle
Shirtwaist Fire, prompted a reevaluation of traditional conceptions of fault. See McEvoy, supra note
132, at 626. For a modem-day challenge to current conceptions of causation, see MARTHA
CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 119
(2010).
179. For instance, in the case of James Lyman at Lawrence Manufacturing Company, the
manufacturer's agent wrote: "I am sorry to say that in this case the responsibility for the accident lies
with us, and an early settlement with the injured party would in my judgment, be a wise thing to do."
Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box GOI (Mar. 21, 1892). In the case of
Jennie Ricker, the agent wrote that Jennie's injury had been caused by the overseer accidentally
bumping her arm while she worked at her sewing machine. Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra
note 163, at Box G02 (Apr. 7, 1993). Similarly, the accident report noted that the company's agents
were liable for injury done to Mary Tighe when carpenters accidentally dropped a board on her head.
Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box G02 (Jan 15, 1897). In the case of John
Sliva and John Silver, the company noted that the elevator machinery was defective and that there was
"apparent liability on our part." Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Mar.
13, 1902). There was also an apparent machinery defect in the case of John Such, where the company
recommended settlement because "there is a question of liability, with chances against us." Letter,
Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Feb. 28, 1903). However, the companies did
not always consider workplace defects as indicating liability; in the case of Albert Mathurin, a
fourteen-year-old boy who was caught between a mule carriage and a post while helping unload the
carriage, the agent wrote regarding a supposed defect: "(?) The place is unavoidably dangerous."
Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Nov. 5, 1903).
180. For additional historical studies of New England mill accidents, see Carl Gersuny, Industrial
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did request compensation asked for sums varying from the amount of
missed wages (from around $3.50 to $7.00 per week) to hospital bills
(ranging from $16 to several hundred dollars depending on the injury), to
compensation for the injury (from a few dollars to several thousand in the
case of wrongful death).181
Since these records are written by the employer, it is hard to tell for
certain why so few workers requested compensation. The scarcity of
requests could be due to several factors, such as lack of rights-
consciousness1 82 or a perception of causation that attributed injury to
personal fault."' Fear of angering the employer and jeopardizing
continued employment likely also played a role; employees who
demanded too much risked losing their jobs.'84 Even when workers were
compensated, they often only received a fraction of what they requested,
and the process of negotiation could be long, emotionally fraught, and
financially draining. Most importantly, however, is that asking for help
from the employer and portraying oneself as the victim may have been
seen as demeaning to the worker's autonomy and self-sufficiency.'" It is
clear from the letters that the manufacturer looked favorably on employees
who behaved humbly when asking for compensation, and this was likely
clear to employees as well. Unwillingness to beg, which would implicitly
acknowledge their dependent status, may have dissuaded many employees
from asking for compensation. The statement of a worker named George
Demars that "this is the fourth time he has been injured, and 'never asked
for a cent before,'"". is telling, since it bespeaks a sense of pride that may
Casualties in Lowell, 1890-1905, 20 LABOR HIST. 435 (1979); and Carl Gersuny, New England Mill
Casualties, 1890-1910, 52 NEW ENG. Q. 467 (1979).
181. Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL4; Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra
note 163, at Boxes GOl, G02.
182. See, e.g., William Felstiner, Richard Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... , 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631, 634-37
(1981) (discussing "naming, blaming, and claiming" as necessary components of the process of rights
assertion); Edwin Cameron, Fourth Leslie Scarman Memorial Lecture: What You Can Do with Rights
17 (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/publications/leslie-scarman
-lectures.htm (positing that part of claiming and exercising rights is feeling that one's moral
citizenship is legitimate).
183. See, e.g., McEvoy, supra note 132, at 626.
184. See, e.g., Accident Report, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Apr. 5,
1905); Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Aug. 21, 1905); Letter, Dwight
Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 4, 1905).
185. See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMs 52, 62 (1988) (discussing the requirement of the legal regime that persons who have suffered
discrimination in the civil rights context portray themselves as victims in order to succeed on their
claims); Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 32 (1990) (discussing the unwillingness of a low-income
client to portray herself as needy even to win her case).
186. Accident Report, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 10, 1906);
Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 8, 1906).
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have kept many employees from requesting compensation.
Two narratives seem to have been particularly successful at promoting
settlement, especially when used in tandem: a humble mien and the threat
of litigation. Employers appear to have been more open to settling with
employees who were "worthy," who approached them deferentially, asked
for low sums such as missed wages, and had a pressing reason for needing
aid, such as extensive family responsibilities or lack of family support.
When this humble, pitiable posture was supplemented by the threat of a
lawsuit (albeit one which the employee stressed she was loath to bring, but
would be compelled to if no settlement was achieved), employers seem to
have actively attempted to encourage the insurance company to provide
compensation.
A few examples illustrate this tactic. A Polish weaver named Mary
Zanic, who was struck in the face when her loom shuttle flew out, visited
the agent to ask for a "small allowance," informing him that "her husband
is very sickly, and cannot help to support her," and showing the agent the
bruises from her injury, which, he noted, "are about the deepest shade of
blue I ever saw."1 87 She also "complain[ed] of severe headaches."188 All
this painted her as sympathetic and humble; yet in the next line, the agent
noted that Zanic had also had "some first class advice from some of her
'Union' friends, whose Secretary was in to speak for her."i" Zanic's
deployment of compassion and potential litigation was effective; the agent
wrote to the insurance company, "This is a case where I should like to
make a small allowance if you feel like contributing."l 90 The insurance
company paid her ten dollars. Similarly, regarding a twenty-eight-year-old
Irish-American whose toes were broken when his foot was caught in an
elevator, the manufacturer wrote, "Mother of Patrick Kennedy was in here
today to see if you could not allow them something. His older brother
advises him to sue the company, but I tried to impress on her that this
would be a foolish thing to do."l91 He added, "These people are worthy of
anything you may wish to do for them."' 9 2 The case was settled for fifty
dollars. Both Zanic and Kennedy delivered a one-two punch, which the




191. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL1 (July 22, 1899).
192. Id. Another example is the case of Victoria Guyotte, a thirty-two-year-old French woman
who brought suit when a loom shuttle struck her in the abdomen, lip, and breastbone,. The
manufacturer wrote, "Her friends ... advise her to fight, still I am of the opinion that if she could be
approached by someone who had authority to 'increase the limit a little,' a satisfactory settlement
might be made. Understand that she is again sick in bed." The suit was eventually settled for $125,
although Guyotte had initially asked for $500. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at
Box HLI (Oct. 2, 1901); Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HLI (Sept. 11,
1901); Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HLI (Aug. 23, 1901).
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agent communicated to the insurance company: if benevolence would not
stir them to provide assistance, perhaps the threat of a lawsuit would.
Notably, neither Zanic nor Kennedy threatened the lawsuit of their own
accord; rather, they emphasized that other persons were encouraging them
to sue. This strategy may have appealed to the employers because it
showed the goodwill of the workers, implying they would personally
prefer to settle by informal channels rather than put all parties through the
strain of a lawsuit.
Sometimes employees did not even directly raise the issue of a suit
when first approaching the employer for compensation; rather, they relied
wholly on their humble, pitiable position to induce settlement. For
instance, employers occasionally encouraged the insurance company to
settle with workers who were the sole source of support for their families
and who approached the employer with humility. After nineteen-year-old
Delia O'Brien got two fingers crushed while cleaning a moving machine,
the agent wrote to the insurance company, stating,
This girl is the sole support of an aged father and crippled brother,
and as she will be out of work for some time, trust you will be able
to see your way clear to help her in some way. Anything you can
do for her, will be greatly appreciated. 193
O'Brien was compensated ten dollars, although, as the mill agent noted,
her injury was "[h]er own fault in not stopping the warper to clean it."' 9 4
Regarding Simon Szetela, a thirty-four-year-old Polish loom fixer who
lost the end of his thumb, the agent wrote, "he has been in our service for a
great many years, has a wife and five small children, the oldest being
eleven, and in consequence is not in very good financial circumstances.
Anything you can do for him, I am sure will be greatly appreciated."l 95
Simon received ten dollars.
Employers also seemed inclined to settle with humble employees who
were "old standbys" and not disposed to threaten suit. Regarding George
Demars, who had worked for Dwight for twelve years, the agent reported,
"Will say that he has quite a serious cut, and is not inclined to make any
193. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 6, 1904); see Accident
Report for Delia O'Brien, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Aug. 18, 1904).
194. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 6, 1904).
195. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Feb. 22, 1907); see Accident
Report for Simon Szetela, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Feb. 18, 1907).
Lack of family support could also induce the employer to act benevolently. Regarding Mary King, a
twenty-one-year-old English millworker who had been in the manufacturer's employ only five months
when she caught her thumb in the gears, the agent wrote, "She has no friends in this locality and as she
appears to be worthy, thought perhaps you might allow her board while she is out, say for two weeks."
Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL1 (Apr. 1, 1899). Similarly, in the case of
an eighteen-year old Polish boy who broke his finger, the agent asked, "This boy has no father and
does not know where his mother is. What shall we say to him when he comes in?" Letter, Dwight
Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL4 (Oct. 2, 1911).
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trouble," noting that Demars had never before requested compensation
despite previous injuries.' 96 Similarly, a sixty-year-old Irish woman named
Kate Neagle appealed to the agent for compensation after she fell, striking
her head; he wrote,
You will see by the report, she is one of our old 'standbys', and
while we, of course are not responsible in any way, feel as though
we would like to give her a little of the money . . . . If you do not
feel that we are coming too often, would like to have you do a little
something for her, she certainly would be very grateful."'
The insurance company granted Neagle fifteen dollars. These records
indicate that where employees could play the role of subservient, grateful
employee, and mobilize additional factors to their advantage such as
family hardship or company loyalty, the manufacturers were disposed to
favor their request and advocate for them to the insurance company, even
minus the threat of a lawsuit.
In juxtaposition, if employees were deemed unworthy-if they drank or
acted entitled to compensation, or if the agent suspected their injuries were
a sham-the agent reported their requests for compensation unfavorably.
Regarding the claim of Ellen McLaughlin, for instance, the agent wrote,
"She is an old woman, and we find that her record is bad, she having been
arrested several times for drunkenness."' 9 8 When one eighteen-year-old
worker named Annie Cronin asked "if there was any insurance due her"
after she injured her hand, the manufacturer's agent wrote that he "could
do nothing for her, as the company was not in any way responsible ....
The people around here seem to think that the Dwight Company is a
charitable institution. Think this will be a good chance to undeceive
them."l99 In another letter, the manufacturer's agent complained that the
insurance company had better send a representative down to talk to a
worker who had lost an eye and demanded three thousand dollars, saying
"in the present attitude of these people . . . I can do nothing with them."200
The records also reveal the employer's displeasure when workers
196. Accident Report, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 8, 1906);
Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 10, 1906).
197. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Apr. 24, 1902); see also
Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Mar. 9, 1906) ("[H]e has been in the
employ of the Company, for about 30 years, and we therefore feel that his case is perhaps more worthy
of notice, than some others. Trusting you can see your way clear to help him in some way .....
198. Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box G02 (Apr. 9, 1896).
199. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HLI (Mar. 14, 1898).
200. Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box GOI (July 6, 1891); see also
Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL3 (Mar. 31, 1908); Letter, Dwight Mfg.
Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL3 (Mar. 10, 1908) (noting that "[s]he 'thinks it the duty of the
Company to pay her wages and expenses,' and she said she would not take a cent less" than fifty-four
dollars for doctors' bills and missed time).
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brought suit without first requesting compensation. When Margaret Freel,
aged sixty, initiated suit after being struck on the head with a loom shuttle,
the agent reported, "She evidently did not care to try for a settlement, as
this is the first word we have had from her."201 After investigating, he told
the insurance company,
this was as you supposed, a trifling injury ... In our opinion, as
she has worked for us for a great many years, and has only herself
to support (no husband or family) she must have considerable
money laid away, and simply wants a few thousand more to retire
on, hence the suit.202
Rather than attempting to settle by appealing to the employer's sense of
benevolence, like Neagle, or hinting at suit if settlement was not
forthcoming, like Zanic, Freel initiated suit directly. By suing immediately
rather than coming to the agent first to ask for compensation, Freel raised
the agent's ire and his suspicion that her injuries were feigned. As was
typical, the agent assumed that employees should first plead their case
before their employer before formally asserting their legal rights.
Adherence to the traditional master-servant relationship form may have
been expected in practice thus, even if it was unsupported by law.2 0 3
Regardless of the worker's humility, the manufacturers and insurance
company were eager to settle quickly where the injury was serious or
where liability was unclear. Settling before employees got wise to the
extent of their injuries or their legal options seems to have been a common
practice across industry sectors, indicating that regardless of any
benevolent intentions of the employers, reducing costs was still the
priority. Seth Low, President of the National Civic Federation-an
organization of large employers of labor, labor representatives, and other
advocates-testified before the New York Legislature in 1910. He told the
story of a railroad agent who commanded the company lawyer to see an
injured employee "as soon as possible, because if you get there this
evening and see him you can settle the claim for $250. But to-morrow, he
will know that he will lose his leg, and then, I don't believe you can settle
for so small a sum." 204 This mentality was reflected at the Massachusetts
201. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Apr. 17, 1902); Letter,
Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Mar. 27, 1902).
202. Id.
203. For other cases of suspected fraud, see Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at
Box HL2 (Oct. 14, 1904); and Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box GO1 (July
10, 1891). The employer's suspicion was not always unfounded. In the case of Charles John, an
Armenian whose arm was amputated after an injury, when the manufacturer's overseer stopped by his
hospital room, he reported "that when he entered the room the man appeared to be quiet, but as soon as
he saw them he commenced to groan, and kept it up all the time they were in the room." Letter,
Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box G02 (Nov. 8, 1892).
204. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE ACCOMPANYING THE FIRST REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
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mills. James Lyman, a worker at Lawrence Manufacturing, caught his arm
in a machine when the engineer mistakenly started it. The agent wrote that
as the company was liable in this case, presumably because the engineer
was Lyman's superior and so covered by the Massachusetts Employer
Liability Act, "an early settlement with the injured party would, in my
judgment, be a wise thing to do." 205 Employers also wanted to settle
before third parties, such as contingency-fee lawyers, could convince a
seriously injured employee to sue. In the case of Charles Robinson, a
forty-five-year old married man who was struck by a falling oil bin, the
Dwight agent wrote, "Succeeded in getting Mr. Robinson and effected a
settlement with him for $60. As you surmised he was approached by a
lawyer of this place, who advised him to attach the company for
$7500.",206
As is evident from these records, several factors went into determining
whether the employer considered a worker to be "worthy" of
compensation: if they were loyal, longtime workers, or were supporting a
family; and if they did not "make trouble" or act entitled to compensation.
Most important of all seems to have been that the employees acted humbly
by coming to the agent to ask for a modest amount of money, instead of
suing immediately, exaggerating their claims, or drawing in unknown
third parties. These factors reflect the traditional master-servant relation of
benefaction and humility discussed above. The master cared for the
servant out of benevolence, not legal duty, and the servant in turn
maintained a place of subordination in the household hierarchy. From the
workers' point of view, obtaining compensation for injury was not
impossible, provided they were willing to swallow their pride and risk
financial hardship. Still, the records reveal that employees who did ask for
compensation used the narratives at their disposal creatively. Some
workers in these factories proved able to mobilize the conflicting but
coexisting stories about themselves; on the one hand, they were abject,
humble servants, while on the other, they were autonomous individuals
capable of suing for their rights.
Employers also had to contend with two other parties, plaintiffs'
STATE OF NEW YORK: BY THE COMMISSION APPOINTED UNDER CHAPTER 518 OF THE LAWS OF 1909
To INQUIRE INTO THE QUESTION OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND OTHER MATTERS 12 (1910)
[hereinafter N.Y. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMMISSION].
205. Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box GO (Mar. 21, 1892). In the case
of Albert Mathurin, a fourteen-year-old French boy who was squeezed between a post and a mule
carriage, the agent for Dwight reported that "[tihe place is unavoidably dangerous" and that "the
Company is liable," so the agent "saw a chance to settle quickly for two weeks wages," or seven
dollars. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Nov. 15, 1903); see Accident
Report of Albert Mathurin, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Nov. 5, 1903).
206. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Oct. 22, 1904); see Accident
Report for Charles Robinson, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Oct. 19, 1904).
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lawyers and interpreters, who could work to manipulate negotiations
between workers and employers for their own benefit. A set cast of
"shyster lawyers" make repeated appearances throughout the records,
indicating a regular dance of representation and settlement that was
performed between the lawyers and the manufacturers.20 7 Under
contingency fee contracts, plaintiffs' lawyers could make good money by
representing accident victims, customarily taking half the amount of
settlement or damages. 208 They routinely visited injured workers in the
hospital to try to convince them to sue.209 It appears some lawyers even
"bought" cases off injured workers. 210 Lawyers levied grandiose threats
against employers, claiming damages of as much as thirty thousand
dollars. 211 The letter of one particularly active lawyer, P.J. Hoar,212 is
instructive; writing on behalf of fourteen-year-old Telesphore Butcher, a
French immigrant who spoke no English and who had injured his hand
and arm on his first day of work, Hoar called upon the manufacturer "to
compensate this boy for his terrible injuries, which I trust you will do as
he is poor and his father is dead and there are a large family of children."
Additionally, covering his bases, Hoar alleged that the boy had been
performing dangerous work with no instructions and no interpreter, and
that he was "not up to the standard of intelligence of boys of his age,"
207. See, e.g., Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Mar. 21, 1902)
("We consider we were fortunate in making these terms with them, as they were both beset with
'shyster' lawyers who were anxious to take the case, and sue for large amounts as they thought they
had a clear case against the Company . . . .").
208. N.Y. EMPLOYERS' LIAB3ILITY COMMISSION, supra note 204, at 6 (testimony of E.T. Devine,
General Secretary of the Charity Organization Society of the City of New York). In 1911, the
Chairman of the Massachusetts Commission on Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation
wrote, "The reason lawyers take cases under the present law, the reason for ambulance chasers, is that
there is a possibility of recovery in some cases of $10,000, and a possibility for the lawyer to make a
charge of from $2,000 to $2,500, a glittering prize in the eyes of unscrupulous men." James Lowell,
Workmen's Comp and the Industries of Massachusetts, 38 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 238,
239 (1911).
209. See, e.g., Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Mar. 20, 1902)
(case of John Sliver) ("Consider we were very fortunate in this case as he has had two lawyers calling
on him every day this week. One from Chicopee Falls, and the other from Holyoke, they offering to
make no charge unless they won the case.")
210. See, e.g., Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL3 (Aug. 8, 1910) (case
of Stani Swavick) (noting that "parties have been trying to get this man to give his case to a
Springfield lawyer, who is said to buy them at a good figure.").
211. Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box GOI (Mar. 16, 1891)(noting the
lawyer said that "unless settlement is made, suit for $30,000 will be commenced forthwith").
212. 1 make this claim given Hoar's prevalence in the records of the Lawrence and Dwight Mills
as well as in cases found on Westlaw. See, e.g., Letter, Hamilton Manufacturing Company Records,
Baker Library Historical Collections, Harvard Business School, vol. 112 (Oct. 6, 1891) [hereinafter
Hamilton Mfg. Co. Records] (indicating that P.J. Hoar represented Frederick Whitney); Letter,
Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box G02 (May 10, 1893) (indicating that P.J. Hoar
represented Delia Roberge); Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box GOI (Mar.
21, 1892) (indicating that P.J. Hoar represented James Lyman); Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records,
supra note 163, at Box GOI (Mar. 16, 1891) (indicating that P.J. Hoar represented Modiste Daigle)..
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claims that would increase the employer's likelihood of liability if proven
true.213 Like the workers, the attorney could appeal to both traditional and
legal narratives; he presented the case to the employer as one that
necessitated benevolence and that had a good chance of winning in
court.214
Interpreters also played a large role in compensation negotiations. Many
of the employees in these mills were recent immigrants who spoke no
English. In addition to a large population of Irish workers, Polish,
Armenian, Syrian, Greek, French, and French Canadian workers made up
a significant portion of the labor force of these mills. Interpreters were
vital to successful negotiations. One particular Polish interpreter who
appears consistently in the records was Paul Starzyk, who (with or without
the knowledge of the workers for whom he was interpreting) played the
middleman by convincing workers to settle.2 15 In one instance, the agent
reported that Starzyk called the office to say that "if your man should be
here within a few days, he could arrange a settlement at a low figure. . . .
We told Starzyk to hold [the injured worker] off for a few days" till the
insurance agent could get there.216 He was well compensated for his
efforts, and with good reason. In one case where the insurance company
apparently refused to pay him, the agent wrote,
Regarding Mr. Starzyk, your Mr. Kinney stirred him a good deal at
the time he was here, and he feels pretty sore and undoubtedly will
take sides against the Company and advise people who come to
him to see a lawyer instead of, as he has been doing, advising them
to settle with the Company here. He says he will get more money
out of it in such cases.217
The agent noted that Starzyk
came here at least four times for these people and think [sic] that
he should have some consideration for advising them to settle for
even this amount ($150), as their first amount was $700, and he is
sure that they would get much more than $150 if lawyers pressed
213. Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box G02 (January 27, 1893).
214. Sometimes lawyers cut right to the chase about settlement; in the case of a woman who
received a "nervous shock" when a mill wall collapsed, her attorneys wrote to notify the company
"before taking action, as a matter of courtesy . . .with the hope also that such a notification may result
in a satisfactory adjustment of the matter." Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 163, at Box
G02 (Sept. 25, 1895) (case of Julia Fitzgerald).
215. In one instance, the agent reported that "[iun making the settlement, the woman evidently
thought the amount was small, but after talking the matter over sometime with Mr. Starzyk, she finally
said she would not bother with it anymore, and would settle for that amount." Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co.
Records, supra note 178, at Box HL3 (Feb. 17, 1910) (case of Victoria Wisnowka).
216. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL3 (Aug. 8, 1910) (case of Stani
Swavick).
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the matter for them.218
After this eruption, the agent noted on other occasions that he "thought
he had better pay" Starzyk whether or not the insurance reimbursed the
cost, apparently concluding that Starzyk's contributions were worth the
extra expenditure.219
B. The Cost ofBenevolence
Notable in the records is the tension experienced by employers between
behaving benevolently toward deserving employees and acting in the
pecuniary interest of the company. Although certainly complicated by
other factors, at a basic level this reflects the conflict between the
traditional role of the master as caretaker of his servants and the modem
industrial role of profit-maximizer in which employees are simply
necessary components of production. Often, these two strains were
intertwined: employers wished to appear to act benevolently even as their
actions were motivated by a desire to save money.
It is evident from the supplicatory posture of the manufacturers' agents
that they felt more inclined to compensate worthy employees than did the
insurance company, which needed persuading. For instance, regarding the
case of Maria Kerrigan, a weaver who caught her hand in her loom, the
insurance company wrote tersely, apparently in response to the agent's
request for payment of the full hospital bill, "We are willing to contribute
$5 towards this bill. The accident was caused by the girl's own
carelessness, and we cannot see that you are in any way responsible for
it."220 The manufacturers experienced conflicting motivations: on the one
hand, they wished to be the benevolent master to workers who played the
humble servant; on the other, they were under pressure from the insurance
company as well as capitalist forces more generally to cut costs by
adhering to the minimal liability requirements of the formal legal regime.
In cases where the insurance company gave the go-ahead to
compensate, the manufacturers settled with the employee in exchange for
the employee's signature to release the company from liability. Although
the agents may have couched their desire to compensate worthy workers
in benevolent terms, their goal was still to "beat [the workers] down" to as
low a settlement as they could.22' In one case, the agent wrote to the
insurance company, "I am trying the Chicopee method of settlement; i.e.
218. Id.
219. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL4 (Dec. 2, 1911) (case of
Apolina Dejiato).
220. Letter from Arnold Hodges, Assistant Manager, to 0. H. Moulton, Hamilton Manufacturing,
Hamilton Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 212, at vol. 112 (Oct. 20, 1892).
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waiting till they get hungry for money before going to see them, and if
possible let them do the calling. Think there will be no trouble in getting
considerably inside of your appropriation." 222 The employers' focus on
drawing out negotiations and the workers' financial inability to support
themselves while injured meant that even in the few cases where
employees did ask for compensation, the amount they eventually received
was far below their initial request. Nicholas Glasky, a forty-two-year-old
Polish coal wheeler with three young children who was injured when a
frozen lump of coal fell on him, originally asked for one thousand dollars,
but, a month and a half after his accident, signed a release for twenty-five
dollars.2 23 Employers knew that their employees, many of whom had
families to feed and little in savings, could not afford to draw out the
bargaining process by waiting for a better deal.
The manufacturers also tried to make themselves seem generous in their
offers even as they stiffed their employees. Regarding a twenty-five-year-
old Syrian man named Mike George who lost a thumb and two fingers in
the gears of his machine, the agent wrote, "I tried to make him think that
paying the Hospital and hack charges, as well as the Doctor's attendance,
was all he could expect. But failing in this, finally offered him $15.00 in
addition." 224 George countered with fifty dollars. However, three days
later George changed his mind and, as the agent reported, "decided that he
wanted to continue working for us. He said he would give us a release for
$15.00, provided we would give him some light work to do, and so that
matter was settled."22 5 The threat of being without work while negotiations
were pending exerted its toll on workers who, like George, "claim[ed] to
be destitute." 22 6 Threatening to withhold work was also a tactic employers
used to stave off potential suits. In the case of Annie Kelly, a young Irish
woman who brought a lawsuit after she was injured her first day alone on
the job, the agent asked the insurer point blank, "Shall we dismiss her, or
is it your wish to try and effect a settlement with her, (in which case it
might be well to use the job as a lever)?"227 They settled with Annie for
222. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Mar. 17, 1902).
223. Accident Report, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Mar. 20, 1906);
Letters, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at HL2 (May 1, 1906; Apr. 23, 1906; Mar. 26,
1906).
224. Accident Report for Mike George, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2
(Aug. 16, 1906); Letters, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 10, 1906; Sept.
7, 1906; Sept. 4, 1906).
225. Letters, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (Sept. 10, 1906; Sept. 7,
1906; Sept. 4, 1906).
226. Id.
227. Accident Report for Annie Kelly, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2
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fifty dollars and twenty dollars in doctors' bills. 228 Both employers and
employees seem to have preferred to settle rather than sue, employees
because they desperately needed money and work,2 29 employers and
insurers because settling was cheaper than litigation. Even in a case where
the employer eventually won, the insurance company still paid over eight
hundred dollars in litigation costs and lawyers' fees.230 Thus, even
seemingly benevolent actions on the part of the employer were still partly,
if not primarily, motivated by a desire to limit expenses.
The tension between benevolence and cost was also complicated by the
involvement of the insurance company, particularly over the practice of
sending seriously injured employees to the hospital. These mills kept
company doctors on call, which had several benefits; not only could
immediate care reduce the extent (and cost) of the injury, but a doctor in
the manufacturer's employ could act in accordance with the company's
best interests. For instance, in several cases where the agents believed
employees to be exaggerating the extent of their injuries, they called the
company doctors to get the real diagnoses.23 ' Company doctors could also
provide the company with the "best possible evidence" in the case of a
suit.23 2 In the event that the injury was serious, however, the employee was
sent to the hospital, and this could lead to conflict with the insurance
company. Whereas Hamilton Manufacturing only paid the hospital bills of
injured employees in exchange for a release from liability, which the
insurance company reimbursed, 233 Dwight Manufacturing had a practice
of paying all hospital bills as a matter of course.234 Only on "rare and
228. Letters, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at HL2 (Sept. 4, 1905; Aug. 21, 1905).
229. One worker, Paul Bressette, told the agent that he preferred to settle, since, "he wants to stay
here, as he has quite a family who like to work with us." Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note
178, at Box HL3 (Feb. 3, 1908).
230. Barker v. Lawrence Mfg. Co, 176 Mass. 203 (1900); Letter, Lawrence Mfg. Co. Records,
supra note 163, at Box G02 (case of William Barker).
231. See, e.g., Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL3 (Mar. 8, 1909) (case
of Frank (Wojiech) Smith) ("As we somewhat doubted that it would be necessary for him to stay out
two months longer, it was left that he should go to the Doctor and find out just how long he would be
obliged to loafe. In the meantime, we called up the Doctor and he said, 'only a few days."')
232. Friedman, supra note 127, at 373 (discussing railway hospitals). These mills also called
company doctors to give evidence at trial. See, e.g., Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178,
at Box HL2 (December 13, 1906) (case of Mary Dunn) (including a bill for services of doctor, fifteen
dollars, "in connection with the Dunn case").
233. See, e.g., Letter, Hamilton Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 212, at vol. 112 (Aug. 8, 1890)
(case of Charles Maguire) (recording a payment of a ten-dollar doctor bill in exchange for release).
234. Lawrence Manufacturing bargained with employees as to both doctors' bills and settlement
amount. They also faced pushback from the insurer. In one instance, apparently in response to the
insurer's skepticism, the manufacturer wrote to justify the expense of sending two employees to the
hospital, saying, "We do not think that either of them had any legal claim against us, but they were
sent to the Hospital from a humanitarian point of view, without inquiry as to whether they had any
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deserving occasions" did Dwight ask for reimbursement from the
insurance company for hospital costs, 235 and the insurance company seems
to have looked askance at these requests. One case involved a worker who
had developed tetanus after receiving a minor cut. To save his life, doctors
treated him with $250 worth of antitoxin medicine, which the insurance
company refused to pay. In response, Dwight's agent wrote angrily,
What are we to do when we have an accident that requires hospital
treatment? We have always understood that we were to give proper
treatment to any accident that came along, regardless of question
of liability, and when cases have required immediate hospital
treatment, we have not hesitated to send them there, believing that
this was the proper course. After reading your letter, we do not
know whether this is the proper course to pursue in the future or
not, but do not see how we can allow anyone to suffer for lack of
proper treatment.236
Similarly, in the case of a worker named John Bickley, the insurance
company declined to reimburse his hospital expense because of the
employee's "probably poor physical condition" prior to the accident.23 7 In
response, the manufacturer wrote the following:
We ... note that you do not think it worth while to pay this bill. If
you do not pay it, the Dwight Co. will have to. As before written
you, we employ a doctor by the year to give first aid to all accident
cases, and it is only on his judgment that cases are sent to the
Hospital. In the case in question, if Bickley had not been sent to
the hospital, there is no question but what it would have been a
decided[ly] more serious case, with consequent increased liability
to your Company in case of a suit.238
The manufacturer then pointedly asked the insurance company for "some
expression . . . as to how we are to decide in the future whether cases are
to be sent to the hospital or not, regardless of the physician's judgment."239
Even though motivated in part by pecuniary concerns, Dwight was
fulfilling the master's traditional duty of maintenance by keeping an on-
site doctor-the equivalent of a family physician, so to speak-and by
235. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL2 (July 10, 1903) (case of
Bridget O'Rourke) ("It was plainly understood that there was no liability in the case, but we thought
that as this Company pays all Doctors bills for attending to the numerous accidents which occur (for
which no charge is made to you), you might perhaps be glad to makeup [sic] a little of this
occasionally. Wish to state that it is only on rare and deserving occasions, when we ask for anything of
this sort. In addition to the above, we also have numerous carriage bills when the help are injured, so
they have to be carried home, and for which we have seldom, if at all, made claim for.").
236. Letter, Dwight Mfg. Co. Records, supra note 178, at Box HL3 (Nov. 5, 1910) (case of
Michael Sebula).
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sending serious cases to the hospital. Dwight's agent also evinced real
concern for the injured employees, even as he requested that the insurance
company foot the bill instead of Dwight. Yet this language of benevolence
was clearly given short shrift by the insurance company; to obtain
reimbursement, Dwight had to justify the practice of sending employees to
the hospital in terms of mitigating costs and avoiding potential lawsuits.
The priorities of the insurance company required the benevolent instincts
with which Dwight approached injured employees to be tempered with the
language of the market and contemporary tort law, in which payment was
justified only in the case of liability.
As these records show, both employers and employees were beset by
outside forces with pecuniary interests in the resolution of affairs. Lawyers
often utilized the language of benevolence as well as the threat of
litigation, while interpreters like Starzyk threatened to provide information
to the workers that would put them on stronger footing vis-a-vis their
employer or encourage the workers to sue instead of settle. Employers had
to balance all these concerns, while also attempting both to aid workers
whom they deemed worthy and to mitigate costs by bargaining down
settlement amounts. The result, as revealed by these records, appears to
have been a continual headache for the manufacturer and a demoralizing,
financially draining process for the injured worker.
These records reveal that some elements of the traditional master-
servant relationship continued to exist in the industrial employment
relationship, albeit mitigated by the capitalist, industrialized, and litigious
environment in which employment occurred. Employers maintained an
ostensibly benevolent attitude toward injured employees who presented a
certain type of claim, while employees utilized the tropes of a subservient
relationship even as they bolstered their claims with the threat of suit. As
the records show, employer benevolence was tempered by and in tension
with the employer's pressure to cut costs and disclaim liability, which was
manifested by the oversight of the insurance company and its control over
the manufacturer's purse-strings. The presence of the insurance company
as final arbiter, as well as the parasitic activity of the plaintiffs' lawyers
and interpreters, created an environment in which the employer-employee
relationship was at the mercy of many external forces with varied
motivations. Employers and employees negotiated amidst these forces, as
well as in the shadow of the traditional master-servant relationship and
contemporary liability law. As the next Part will explore, the inadequacy
of this quasi-master/quasi-market approach to compensation was
instrumental in giving rise to calls for workers' compensation.
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V. PRESERVATION THROUGH TRANSFORMATION: WORKERS'
COMPENSATION AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
As Part IV has shown, there were significant reasons for both employers
and employees to be dissatisfied with the employer liability regime at the
turn of the nineteenth century. Insurance companies prevented employers
from exercising their discretion about when to exercise their benevolence
to compensate deserving employees. The spread to other states of the
Employer's Liability Laws, which hampered or removed the employer's
traditional defenses against suit for workplace injury, also increased the
uncertainty of the outcome of employee lawsuits.240 For workers, the
processes of both negotiating informally and pursuing a lawsuit exposed
them to financial hardship and uncertainty, loss of work, and pressure
from lawyers and other self-interested actors.24 '
In addition to the dissatisfaction of employers and employees,
government actors and the public were discontented with the state of
employer liability law. As labor activists and news reporters brought the
horrors of industrial accidents to public attention, public awareness of the
human costs of industrialization increased. Injured workers unable to
obtain compensation also burdened public and private charities.242 As this
Part will show, various forces aligned in the early years of the twentieth
century to make reform of the system of employer liability, particularly
workers' compensation, a palatable solution to these problems. The view
of Progressivism that industrial society as a whole is better off when
individuals are taken care of undergirded attempts by labor activists and
the government to press for solutions to the problem of industrial
accidents. At the same time, shifts in legal thought away from the
contract-centric classical view of law to social legal thought, in which the
free will of the individual played a less prominent role, promoted legal
change as an avenue for addressing large-scale social problems like
workplace injury. Both of these factors have been discussed by other
scholars of the period. This Article will focus on a third influential factor
in the development of workers' compensation laws: the framing of the
240. MARK ALDRICH, SAFETY FIRST: TECHNOLOGY, LABOR, AND BUSINESS IN THE BUILDING OF
AMERICAN WORK SAFETY, 1870-1939, at 152 (1997); Fishback and Kantor, supra note 127, at 316.
As noted above, private insurance funds like the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company
sprang up to help manufacturers address these costs. See supra Part IV. Other employers, such as
railroads and large-scale manufactories, developed private compensation schemes. WITT, supra note
31, at 103-05, 113-17. For instance, in 1910 the U.S. Steel Company implemented a large-scale
voluntary accident relief plan across its affiliate firms, motivated by the idea that "the victim of an
industrial accident or his dependents should receive compensation not as an act of grace on the part of
his employer but as a right." Id. at 103-05, 113-17. Workers also created mutual benefit societies. For
a description of those societies and the problems they faced, see id. at 99-101.
241. Asher, supra note 127, at 456; Witt, supra note 14, at 1497.
242. ALDRICH, supra note 240, at 151.
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worker, by labor activists, government officials, and workers themselves,
as the master of his own household. This rhetorical move cemented (male)
workers as independent market actors responsible for their own
dependents, even as the end result was to establish the legal dependency of
the worker on his employer for care in the case of injury. The effect of this
preservation-through-transformation was to conceptualize workingmen as
neither completely independent individuals nor completely dependent
servants. Rather, even as workers were formally recognized as the masters
of their own households, a central element of the traditional master-
servant relationship-the right to maintenance and the inability to sue for
workplace injury-became law in the form of workers' compensation.
A. Progressivism and Social Legal Thought: Embracing Workers'
Compensation
Increased awareness of widespread social problems caused by
industrialization and the interconnectedness of industrial society gave rise
to a new ethic of social responsibility in the Progressive reform
movement. Progressivism was based on the idea that the state and society
should act benevolently and paternally to aid disadvantaged groups; since
society was deeply interconnected, such social responsibility was not only
morally required, but would also benefit society as a whole.243 The
Progressive view is exemplified in a 1907 article arguing for workers'
compensation, which stressed that "the modern view of the duty of the
State . . . is actuated by an intelligent selfishness represented by the
formula that what is good for one is best for all," and that society had "a
moral obligation, the acknowledgment that those who, by the accident of
nature or even by their own laches, are less fortunate must, in a sense, be
taken care of by the more fortunate." 244
Progressivism challenged the belief in individual self-reliance and free
will that had been so widespread the century before. New methods of
understanding causation, particularly statistics, threatened the assumption
that an individual's actions were completely under his control. As Barbara
Welke and others have shown, the study of statistics prompted a
reassessment of common beliefs about causation; statistical evidence
challenged the assumption that it was an individual's own fault an
accident occurred.245 Progressive labor activist Crystal Eastman was
243. Id. at 148-49; Go, supra note 127, at 415.
244. A. Maurice Low, Shifting the Burden: Compensation for Injuries, 185 N. AM. REV. 651, 659
(1907).
245. WELKE, supra note 127, at 8, 13 (discussing "a broader shift in the dislocation of the
individual from the causal chain"); WIrr, supra note 31, at 140-42 (discussing the "statistical
annulment of individual agency" brought about by the shift in reasoning about causation); Friedman,
supra note 127, at 376-77; Kennedy, supra note 10, at 51.
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instrumental to promoting this view; her study of over a thousand work
accidents in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, in which she showed that
annually about five hundred workers were "mutilated" due to industrial
accidents, illustrated clearly for the American public the inevitability of
workplace accidents regardless of the individual worker's fault.2 46
Eastman and other labor advocates revealed that industrial injuries were
largely the result of structural aspects of the workplace such as the high
speed of the work and the lack of safety mechanisms, rather than
individual employee carelessness.2 47 If workers' injuries were not the
result of their own carelessness but the inevitable cost of an industrial
workplace, then society had a moral duty to provide for these "injured
veteran[s] of industry. "248
Along with the shift in conception of the worker from independent actor
to one subject to forces outside his control came an interrogation of
classical legal thought's belief in freedom of contract. In light of the
inevitability of industrial accidents and the recognition that individual
workers lacked practical bargaining power to address the possibility of
accidental injury, turn-of-the-century legal scholars challenged the law's
assumption of contractual equality in the employment relationship. A legal
scholar in 1911 explained that state regulation such as workers'
compensation was necessary because "the workman, especially in large
undertakings, does not have it in his power to modify the conditions of his
service." 24 9 Other legal scholars challenged the doctrine of contributory
negligence; for instance, one scholar wrote that contrary to the "highly
individualistic natural rights philosophy of the common law," "[s]tatistics
of work accidents . . . contain abundant proof that negligence, in the sense
of occasional lapses of that care and watchfulness which are the only
human traits of the 'reasonably prudent man', is a very common
failing."250 He mocked the "'reasonable man' of the common law," who
never relaxes his vigilance under the influence of monotony,
fatigue, or habituation to danger, never permits his attention to be
diverted, even for a moment, from the perils which surround him,
246. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 135-42 (1910).
247. See WITrT,supra note 31, at 144; McEvoy, supra note 132, at 643.
248. N.Y. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMMISSION, supra note 204, at 95 (testimony of Samuel
Gompers) ("No one criticizes the generosity to the old soldier and to the old soldiers' widows and to
his orphans, but if we are bearing that burden, the cost of which we are paying with such pleasurable
pride, we ought to be willing to do something for the men and women of labor who are doing the great
service to society, and in peaceful, industrial occupations . . . ."); see Arthur Larson, The Nature and
Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 206, 210 (1952); Witt, supra note 14, at
1495.
249. Eugene Wambaugh, Worlanen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Their
Constitutionality, 25 HARV. L. REv. 129, 131 (1911).
250. EZEKIEL DOWNEY, HISTORY OF WORK ACCIDENT INDEMNITY IN IOWA 13,52 (1912).
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never forgets a hazardous condition that he has once observed, and
never ceases to be on the alert for new sources of danger.2 51
Such a "reasonable man" was clearly a fallacy, and basing the law of
employer liability on this chimera was absurd.
These challenges to the basic presumptions of freedom of contract and
free will, along with the social awareness promoted by Progressivism,
influenced the development of sociological jurisprudence, or social legal
thought. Social legal thought saw law as a regulatory mechanism to be
employed for the good of society, rather than a means of enforcing private
contracts created by individual will.252 The public interest in minimizing
industrial conflict and ensuring steady production justified top-down
government regulation that rejected the freedom of contract, individual-
based emphasis of classical legal thought.2 53 Instead, labor law reformers
embraced a conception of state-enforced employer altruism and
paternalism. 25 4 Progressive scholar Roscoe Pound was a staunch
proponent of social legal thought in the area of labor law reform. Pound
saw the focus on freedom of contract and the will theory as an unfortunate,
"alien" importation of Roman law into Anglo-American jurisprudence,
and advocated for the reintegration of the "true common law conception"
of "feudal law," centered on the relationship of the parties. 255 Reflecting
on workers' compensation and employer liability law, Pound wrote in
1916 that "duties and liabilities are imposed on the employer in the
relation of employer and employee, not because he has so willed, not
because he is at fault, but because the nature of the relation is deemed to
call for it." 25 6 He went on,
Some have said that modern labor legislation creates a status of
being a laborer, and this has frightened more than one court. For
status is felt to be an archaic legal institution which we have
outgrown . . . . [Yet] it is not out of line with the common law to
deal with causes where the relation of master and servant exists
differently from causes where there is no such relation. It is not out
of line to deal with such causes by determining the duties and the
liabilities which shall flow from the relation. On the contrary, the
nineteenth century was out of line with the common law when it
sought to treat the relation of master and servant in any other
251. Id at 53.
252. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 25.
253. Id. at 42.
254. Id. at 50.
255. Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought II, 30 HARV. L. REv. 201,
217-18 (1917); see Kennedy, supra note 10, at 49;
256. Pound, supra note 255, at 219-20.
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way. 257
In other words, Pound said, the laborious effort of nineteenth-century
classical legal scholars to move the servant out of the household and into
the free labor market, detailed in Part I, was inconsistent with the true
common law and with the best interests of society.
As Pound's commentary reveals, as a result of Progressivism and social
legal thought, the worker was no longer viewed as self-reliant,
independent, or individually responsible; rather, he was at the mercy of
industrial forces beyond his control, dependent on his employer and the
state to protect him. This portrayal of workers as helpless and dependent is
revealed in much of the literature involving workers' compensation at the
time. In 1907, an official from the U.S. Bureau of Labor who had studied
workers' compensation in England argued that workers composed "a class
which the State was morally bound to protect because it was incapable of
protecting itself," either because of "their own folly or ignorance" or "the
cupidity or indifference of their employers." 258 Because workers could not
bargain for compensation in case of workplace injury, state regulation was
necessary to protect them. New York Labor Commissioner P. Tecumseh
Sherman explained, "Workingmen as a class are... practically unable to
make provision for themselves and families in case of accidental
disablement or death . . . . Expressed somewhat brutally, these men are as
much an item of production as machinery worn out or coal consumed." 2 59
Progressive labor activists and state actors argued that workers'
compensation laws were necessary to provide for workers who could not
provide for themselves.
B. Working a Market Identity: Masculinity, Separate Spheres, and
Workers' Compensation
This view of workers as dependent and helpless was anathema to both
workers themselves and to legal scholars who still adhered to the ideology
of independent manhood, which supported the legal principles of free will
and freedom of contract. Free labor ideology had exerted a powerful
influence over workers' conceptions of themselves as independent, rights-
bearing individuals not subject to their employer's oversight. Workers
prized maintaining authority over their own workplaces, and admitting
that certain aspects of their employment were outside their control
"threatened to routinize and legitimize increased managerial control of the
257. Id. at 220.
258. Low, supra note 244, at 652.
259. R. Higgens-Evenson, From Industrial Police to Workmen's Compensation: Public Policy
and Industrial Accidents in New York, 1880-1910, 39 LABOR HIST. 365, 378 (1998).
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workplace." 260 However, the political tide had turned toward workers'
compensation, and workers ultimately realized that the only avenue for
meaningful reform of workplace injury law was through workers'
compensation. To combat the implications of dependency and
helplessness inherent in the concept of workers' compensation, workers
and their unions mobilized the rhetoric of separate spheres and the
responsibility of the master of the household to provide for his dependents.
This trope had been utilized by labor advocates for the past century in
support of other aspects of government-mandated labor reform, such as
the family wage. Arguments that labor advocates had mobilized in support
of a family wage were easily translated into arguments in favor of
workers' compensation. The separate spheres argument allowed workers
to frame themselves as masculine masters of their own households even as
they conceded their dependency on their employer in the workplace
through the embrace of workers' compensation.
Adherents of free labor and freedom of contract ideology within the
legal institution considered the idea of mandatory, no-fault employer
liability abhorrent to American individualism and a threat to workers'
masculinity. Walter Nichols, the editor of the Personal Injury Journal of
New York, wrote in 1911 that workers' compensation was "an attack on
the manhood of employees as American citizens."261 Nichols summarized
the public policy justifications for workers' compensation, noting that
economic differentiation
has widened the gulf between the workman and his employer,
which has weakened the personal relations once existing between
the two, and has reduced the former to little more than a machine
to be exploited under a new system of employment . . . . [G]iant
monopolies of capital have practically reduced the workmen to a
condition of industrial servitude.262
Yet although workers' compensation might be permissible in the
"monarchical systems of the old world," such regulation was not the
answer in America, "unless socialism is to be substituted for individualism
in the spirit of our constitution." 2 63 The problem with workers'
compensation, Nichols explained, was that it created a "servile class":
By such laws those who contract for their personal services are
placed in a class by themselves politically subordinate to the rest of
their fellows. They are no longer to be dealt with as freeborn
260. Witt, supra note 14, at 1491, 1496.
261. Walter Nichols, An Argument against Liability, 38 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOc. SC.
159 (1911).
262. Id. at 161.
263. Id. at 161-62.
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citizens competent like others to care for their own affairs, and
capable like others of engaging in all the activities of business life
unfettered by political restraints. . . . They are to be dealt with as
incompetent wards of the state who must be protected against
themselves, incapable of freely contracting for their services and
subject like the medieval serfs to assumed task-masters, who must
answer for their safety and be responsible for their mishaps.26
Workers' compensation was anathema to American values because it
made the workingman a servant. Rather than create a situation in which
workers were "industrial serfs, wards of the state incapable of self-
protection," Nichols advocated for an approach that saw "every worker
standing side by side with his employer as a political sovereign trained to
insure his own protection," with the aid of state-regulated wage floors and
bolstered by voluntary insurance programs. 2 65 Nichols embraced the free
labor ideal of the worker as an independent individual on relatively equal
footing with his employer, responsible for himself with only limited
assistance from the state.
At first many workmen also looked with disfavor on workers'
compensation, which like Nichols they saw as codifying the worker's
dependence on his employer.266 Central to their claims was that the focus
on workers' need for state assistance demeaned workers and offended
American notions of independence and self-reliance. As noted above, the
ethos of free labor and individualism had created a working-class culture
that was loath to classify white male workers along with women or
slaves.267 Workers and their unions feared that making workers depend on
employers for injury compensation would stigmatize them as a socially
inferior class of persons.2 68 They also worried that workers' compensation
laws would encourage employers to exercise more control over the
workplace in order to reduce accidents, which would entrench more
deeply the hierarchy of managerial control of production and limit
workers' ability to exercise discretion in the performance of their tasks.269
Unions voiced concern that if they pressed for employer responsibility for
workplace injuries, they would effectively concede workers' lack of
discretion and independence and cede control of the workplace to
264. Id. at 163.
265. Id. at 164-65.
266. Wnr, supra note 31, at 147; see Employers' Liability and Workmen's Compensation:
Hearing on H.R. 20487 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 62nd Cong. 467-68 (1913) (statement
of Samuel Gompers, President, American Federation of Labor).
267. BRONSTEIN, supra note 127, at 123.
268. Witt, supra note 14, at 1498.
269. Wir, supra note 31, at 88, 105, 113-15; Higgens-Evanson, supra note 259, at 371-72; see
Samuel Gompers, The Miracles ofEfficiency, 18 AM. FEDERATIONIST 273 (1911).
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Rather than rely on workers' compensation schemes, workers simply
wished that "the lives and limbs of wage-workers shall be regarded as
sacred as those of all others of our fellow human beings" in the event of an
accident.27 Workers did not want to give up the ability to sue their
employers;27 2 instead, they preferred to strengthen employer liability
laws.273 In pursuit of this goal, unions focused initially on lobbying for
legislative reform to remove the triad of employer defenses to liability.274
They argued that workers "ought to be on the same footing before the law
as passengers." 27 5 in other words, workers asked to be treated as strangers
vis-A-vis their employer in terms of liability for injury. They also preferred
injury compensation options that maintained worker independence and
self-governance, such as workmen's cooperative insurance associations.2 7 6
As John Witt discusses, these worker associations drew heavily on free
labor ideology, stressing the independence, fraternity, equality, and
manliness of workmen. 277
However, these options eventually became too burdensome; cooperative
associations could not provide enough to cover the costs of accidents,278
and workers proved unable to achieve sufficiently stringent employer
liability laws in the legislatures.2 79 Faced with growing support for
workers' compensation among other interest groups, at last unions entered
the discussion. 280 To mitigate the unwelcome implications of dependency,
unions tried to frame compensation as a right, rather than as largesse. In
1911, the Vice President of the American Federation of Labor (AFL)
270. WrTr, supra note 31, at 88-89; Go, supra note 127, at 421-23. Workers had some degree of
control over the internal specifics of production through such practices as "inside contracts," in which
workers contracted with managers to take individual charge of specific projects, or, within a unionized
workforce, by regulating tasks amongst themselves. WITT, supra note 31, at 105; Witt, supra note 14,
at 1473.
271. Go, supra note 127, at 410 (quoting Gompers).
272. Barbara Nelson, The Origins of the Two-Channel Welfare State: Workmen's Compensation
and Mothers'Aid, in WOMEN, THE STATE, AND WELFARE 123, 135 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990).
273. N.Y. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMMISSION, supra note 204, at 162 (testimony of John M.
O'Hanlon, Editor, Legislative Labor News).
274. Witt, supra note 14, at 1497.
275. Id.
276. WITT, supra note 31, at 82-86.
277. Id. at 86.
278. Id. at 99-101; N.Y. EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY COMMISSION, supra note 204, at 7 (Testimony of
E.T. Devine, General Secretary of the Charity Organization Society of the City of New York).
279. Keating, supra note 127, at 155-56.
280. Samuel Gompers, Editorial, 18 AM. FEDERATIONIST 298 (1911) ("Seemingly the American
public has just awakened to the fact that of all civilized countries of the world, Turkey and the United
States are the only two left that still cling to the old common-law doctrine of liability with respect to
industrial accidents. This awakening will force upon the workers of the United States some kind of
workmen's compensation legislation, and unless Labor takes an active part in the movement its
interests in regard to this will not be properly safeguarded."); see Witt, supra note 14, at 1499.
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argued that under workers' compensation, "a man receives as a right, not
as a benefaction, a definite amount of money-a sufficient amount to tide
him or his dependents over the period of greatest distress." 281 Yet during
the debates over workers' compensation laws, workers and union leaders
were also compelled to admit that workers could not fulfill the ideal of the
independent, freely laboring individual.282
So how did workers and labor advocates reconcile the new framing of
dependency in the context of workplace injury with the entrenched
ideology of masculinity and independence? The ideology of separate
spheres-that the home was the site of altruism, inhabited by the wife and
children, in contrast to the market, a space for cutthroat competition in
which only men engaged2 83-provided a valuable rhetorical tool for
workingmen and labor advocates. They drew on the rhetoric of separate
spheres to portray workingmen as independent heads of their own
households, even as they used this framing to justify workers' dependence
on their employers for compensation. This argument positioned the worker
as a freely laboring market actor, who exercised mastery over (and thus
bore the duty of maintenance for) his own dependents at home.
In so doing, workers utilized a trope they had employed throughout the
previous century when arguing for such labor reforms as a family wage.
Workingmen had mobilized the family wage argument since at least the
early nineteenth century.284 Workmen needed a family wage, they argued,
in order to support their families. 285 This argument positioned the worker
as a freely laboring market actor, who exercised mastery over (and thus
bore the duty of maintenance for) his own dependents at home. The goal
of separate spheres would be unattainable, unions and labor activists
argued, unless the workingman earned enough so that his wife and
children did not have to work. Although many women were also wage-
earners, particularly low-income and immigrant women, their
marginalization made it difficult for them to shape the terms of the debate
281. John Mitchell, Burden of Industrial Accidents, 38 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 76,
82 (1911) (emphasis added).
282. Witt, supra note 14, at 1492, 1499-1500.
283. This was aspirational rather than descriptively true; in 1860, approximately fifteen percent of
women worked outside the home, and many more took in piecework or boarders. KESSLER-HARRIS,
supra note 30, at 71. In 1900, 5.6% of married women worked. Nelson, supra note 272, at 132.
284. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 30, at 51; Martha May, Bread Before Roses: American
Workingmen, Labor Unions, and the Family Wage, in FAMILIES IN THE US: KINSHIP AND DOMESTIC
POLITICS 4-5 (Karen Hansen & Anita Garey eds., 1998).
285. Go, supra note 127, at 425. Not all labor advocates supported the family wage, however; at
the turn of the twentieth century, the American Federation of Labor opposed wage floors for male
workers on the ground that such legislation interfered with unions' ability to bargain. However, they
endorsed such protection for women, so that women workers could not undercut male workers by
taking lower wages. May, supra note 284, at 10. Eventually, however, the AFL came round to
supporting a working wage. Id. at 8.
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outside the rhetoric of separate spheres.2 86 Whereas, in the middle of the
century, employers and free market proponents strongly opposed the
concept of a family wage, by the turn of the century such an idea had
become widely accepted, due in part to the entrenchment of separate
spheres ideology. 287 Through the family wage argument, workers made
use of their ambiguous status by relying on state regulation, which had
previously been reserved for status relations like marriage, in order to
allow them to play the role of master in their own homes.
The ideology of separate spheres provided many advantages for labor
reform. Separate spheres justified fencing off women workers from the
market, removing the threat that women workers, who had less bargaining
power and so could be paid less, would drag down the wages of
workingmen. 288 In 1867, William Sylvis of the National Labor Union
claimed, "It will be fatal to the cause of labor, when we place the sexes in
competition, and jeopardize those social relations which render woman
queen of the household. Keep her in the sphere which God designed her to
fill, by manly assistance."2 89 Similarly, in 1893, Samuel Gompers argued
that
the capitalist class . . . has degraded society . . . . It has
accomplished this . . . by undermining the very foundation of
society, the family life of the workers, in reducing the wages of the
adult male workers below the cost of family maintenance and then
employing both sexes of all ages to compete against each other.2 90
Separate spheres also bolstered the desire of working-class men to mimic
286. Minow reports the statement of one woman at the 1912 Congressional hearing on women's
suffrage as saying, "You men say to us: 'Go back to the home. Your place is in the home,' yet as
children we must come out of the home at 11, at 13, and at 15 years of age to earn a living; we have
got to make good or starve." Minow, supra note 1, at 874-75; see Laslett & Brenner, supra note 41, at
399 ("Working-class women's vulnerability to exploitation in wage labor, their marginalization in the
trade union movement, the impoverished conditions under which home work had to be done, the
importance of female kin networks in pooling resources for survival, the commitment of potential
middle-class allies to separate spheres, the apparent inevitability of these conditions, left working-class
women with little space to articulate strategies that did not assume a gendered division of labor."). The
separate spheres ideology was also helpful to women in some degree. For instance, Laslett and
Brenner discuss how it bolstered the ability of women to sue their husbands for maintenance. Laslett &
Brenner, supra note 41, at 390. For information about women workers' union activities, see Diane
Kirkby, "The Wage-Earning Woman and the State": The National Women 's Trade Union League and
Protective Labor Legislation, 1903-1923, 28 LABOR HIsT. 54, 66 (1987), where she discusses the
WTUL's support of protective labor legislation in order to equalize the bargaining power of women
workers with their male counterparts.
287. May, supra note 284, at 2.
288. Laslett & Brenner, supra note 41, at 390-91.
289. May, supra note 284, at 5; see CLINTON, supra note 41, at 19; Kirkby, supra note 277, at 59-
60, 69.
290. Samuel Gompers, President, Am. Fed'n of Labor, What Does Labor Want?: Address to the
International Labor Congress (Aug. 28, 1893).
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the family structure of the upper classes. 291 Reflecting this, William
English, the leader of National Trades' Union in 1835, expressed the
desire that someday "our wives, no longer doomed to servile labor, will be
the companions of our fireside and the instructors of our children." 292
The family wage was also argued to be important not just for working-
class men, but also for the stability and progress of society and the
economy as a whole. 293 As early as 1833, labor advocate Seth Luther drew
on the impoverishment of home life to advocate for workmen's suffrage.
He wrote of the workingman,
His wife and children, too, frequently subjected to the same
process [of labor], are unable to cheer his moments of leisure.
Domestic economy is unknown. Meals are prepared and devoured
with heedless haste. Home has no other relation to him than as a
shelter. . . . His house is ill furnished and uncleanly, frequently
damp; his food is meagre and innutritious; he is debilitated and
hypochondriacal, and he falls the victim of dissipation.294
Half a century later, records of the 1883 Hearing on Labor and Capital by
the U.S. Senate Commission on Education and Labor indicate that
workingmen and their unions continued to mobilize separate spheres
rhetoric to argue for a family wage. Testimony at the hearing revealed that
the current state of the worker's home life was not only dismal, but also
disturbingly contrary to the ideal of the home as an altruistic sanctuary
from the market. The continuation of the protected, isolated family was
seen as vital to the existence of the market, since it "provided reassurance
that certain traditional human values would not be lost to society when
they were banished from the market." 29 5 Like Luther, Samuel Gompers
testified that low wages meant the family could only get by if wives and
children also worked: "By this means the home ... is broken up; indeed
there is hardly the semblance of a home, and in these instances where the
wife goes out to work no meal is cooked." 296 For both Luther and
Gompers, the inability of workers to fulfill the ideal of separate spheres
injured the health and welfare of the entire family, particularly the male
household head, which in turn threatened the capitalist market system.
Both labor advocates raised the specter of the market invading the home in
order to tap into their listeners' fear of the dissolution of the family/market
291. Id. at 5; Laslett & Brenner, supra note 41, at 387.
292. May, supra note 284, at 5.
293. See, e.g., Gompers, supra note 280.
294. Luther, supra note 30, at 14-15.
295. Olsen, supra note 1, at 1524.
296. Testimony as to the Relations Between Labor and Capital: Taken Before the S. Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 48th Cong. 278 (1883) (examination of Samuel Gompers, President, American
Federation of Labor); see EASTMAN, supra note 246, at 135-42.
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distinction and sympathy for the workman who had no peaceful sanctuary.
Drawing on the same separate spheres argument used in the family
wage debates, unions and labor activists justified workers' compensation
as necessary to ensure that the worker, as master of his household, could
provide for his own dependents. This argument minimized the dependency
on the employer created by workers' compensation laws and focused
attention on the worker's role as master of his own household. Labor
advocates argued that compensation for accidental injury was necessary to
support a worker's family in the event of his injury or death.2 97 For
instance, Crystal Eastman wrote in 1910 of the dire circumstances faced
by families who had lost the male breadwinner: children left school to
work, and widows took whatever jobs they could find, which "almost
invariably means hard work, long hours, poor pay, and in most cases
children neglected."2 98 The Vice President of the American Federation of
Labor (AFL) used the same trope in 1911, saying,
The greatest disaster that can befall the family of a wage-earner is
to have the father and bread-winner carried lifeless into his home,
and the shock of this calamity comes with added force when the
death is due to an industrial accident-yet in our country this
tragedy is enacted more than 100 times each day, more than 35,000
times each year!2 99
Combining Progressive social responsibility with separate spheres
rhetoric, he claimed it was "inhuman to permit widows and orphans of
men who have died in the performance of their duty to be left without
suitable provision for their future maintenance." 300 Similarly, legal scholar
Ezekiel Downey wrote in 1912 that
when it is remembered that a large majority of those killed or
injured while at work are responsible for the maintenance of others
as well as of themselves, the reader will be prepared to learn that
the 'by-products' of employers' liability are want, dependence,
child labor, and the breaking up of homes.o'
Workers and labor advocates threatened that industrial accidents "undid
free labor's distinction between home and work" by forcing women and
children into the market.302
297. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
298. EASTMAN, supra note 246, at 136.
299. Mitchell, supra note 281, at 76.
300. Id. at 80.
301. Downey, supra note 240, at 77.
302. WiTT, supra note 31, at 130. This separate spheres ideology was incorporated into many of
the first workers' compensation statutes. Under these statutes, if a male worker died, his widow and
children could recover compensation; but if a woman worker died, her widower could not recover,
even if in reality the family had depended on her income. Id. at 132-34. As Barbara Nelson discusses,
this was the start of the two-channel welfare state, in which welfare programs were constructed on the
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By drawing on separate spheres rhetoric of home and market and the
concomitant ideal of the masculinized breadwinner, male workers were
able to mobilize their position as independent market actors and as family
heads to argue for government regulation of the employment relationship,
including both the family wage and workers' compensation. The effect of
this rhetoric was to solidify male workers' position as independent
individuals by refraining them as the masters of their own households. In
so doing, however, they reinscribed the dependent position of women and
children within the home. They also posed an implicit challenge to the free
labor conception of the worker as a rights-bearing, independent individual
within the workplace. The family wage, after all, depended on a protective
floor set by the legislature and enforced against the employer, while
workers' compensation, as will be discussed below, required the worker to
forgo some rights in exchange for guaranteed maintenance. In advocating
for the involvement of the state, therefore, workingmen tacitly admitted
that they alone were not capable of independently bargaining for
themselves.
The debate regarding the nature of the employment relationship at the
turn of the century involved whether it was a relation between equal
individuals, based on free will and freedom of contract, or a relation, like
the traditional status relation of master and servant, shaped and regulated
by the state instead of the individual parties. The legal case over the
constitutionality of workers' compensation in New York reflects these two
competing views.
In 1910, the New York legislature enacted a workers' compensation law
that allowed recovery for accidents caused by inherently dangerous work
conditions or the lack of due care of the employer or employees, and
provided workers with a choice of whether to sue in tort or apply for
compensation.30 3 The law had been enacted in part on the grounds that the
burden of accidents borne by the workers "brings many of them and their
families to want," signaling that labor advocates' separate spheres
argument had been effective.304 In the 1911 case of Ives v. South Buffalo
Railway, the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, struck
down this law.30s This case drew on the same rhetoric of individual
responsibility and free labor that was prominent in the nineteenth-century
assumption that men were the primary breadwinners, while women were the primary caretakers of
children. Nelson, supra note 272, at 124.
303. An Act To Amend the Labor Law, in Relation to Workmen's Compensation in Certain
Dangerous Employments, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1945.
304. 201 N.Y. 271, 286 (1911).
305. Id. at 298. For a discussion of another early workers' compensation statute, in Wisconsin,
see Keating, supra note 127, at 152-54.
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employer liability cases.306 The New York Court of Appeals found that the
law violated the state constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment's
prohibition on deprivation of property without due process by
"authoriz[ing] the taking of the employer's property without his consent
and without his fault" 307-in other words, by forcing the employer to pay
maintenance to a worker in the event of injury, even absent express
wrongdoing on the part of the employer. Tellingly, both the majority and
concurring opinions distinguished the master-servant relationship from
that of husband and wife; in his concurrence, the Chief Justice wrote that
"individual citizens . . . guilty of no fault, cannot be compelled to
contribute to the indemnity of other citizens who, by misfortune or the
fault of themselves or others, have suffered injuries."30 s However, he
quickly noted, "Of course, I am not now referring to obligations springing
from domestic relations."3 09 The Chief Justice's opinion saw both
employer and employee as "free citizens," distinguishable from status
relations like husband and wife. In other words, employer and employee
were definitively not in the household, and so no relationship of
dependency and concomitant duty of care obtained.
The New York legislature rewrote the statute, which was challenged
again a few years later in Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co.3"o Like the
previous act, this one was also based on the proposition that the "loss
should not fall on the injured employee and his dependents, who are
unable to bear it or to protect themselves against it.""' Unlike the first act,
this one undertook to protect the employee from "the expense,
uncertainties, and delays of litigation" by removing the employee's option
of suing his employer in tort. 312 This, the court found, saved the statute.
Instead of a one-sided taking of property, now the state required "both
employer and employee to yield something toward the establishment of a
principle and plan of compensation for their mutual protection and
advantage." 313 The court admitted that the denial of the employee's right
to sue in tort may constitute a taking, but justified this by explaining that
he was now "assured of a definite compensation" in return for giving up
"the doubtful privilege of having a jury assess his damages, a considerable
306. See supra Part Ill.
307. 201 N.Y. at 298.
308. Id. at 319 (Cullen, C.J., concurring). The majority opinion likewise rejected the comparison
of employer liability with the husband's common-law liability for torts against his wife, because under
coverture the husband owned the wife's property and was bound to pay her debts. Id. at 311.
309. Id.
310. 215 N.Y. 514 (1915).
311. Id. at 524.
312. Id.
313. Id at 528.
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part of which, if recovered at all after long delay, must go to pay expenses
and lawyer's fees." 314 The scheme was constitutional because in exchange
for employers' paying compensation, workers gave up the legal right to
sue. This trade-removing the legal action available to "individual
citizens" in exchange for guaranteed compensation-mimicked the
relation of the members of the household. Wives and children, after all,
could not sue their husbands or fathers in court; they had no legal right to
do so. But in turn, they were entitled to, and the husband/father was bound
to provide, "necessaries" to keep them from want.315 In effect, the
workers' compensation law mimicked the structure of the early modem
master-servant relationship: in return for the master's maintenance,
servants ceded an element of their legal independence. By 1920, forty-
three states had enacted workers' compensation legislation like the statute
at issue in Jensen.3 16
Workers' compensation thus created an uneasy equilibrium for
employees between status and contract, family and market. On the one
hand, labor advocates utilized the language of free labor to argue that
because workers were independent individuals, the heads of their homes,
they needed to be able to provide for their own dependents. However, this
very argument positioned workers as dependent vis-A-vis their employers,
because they relied on them for compensation in case of injury. In return
for guaranteed compensation, furthermore, workers forsook tort claims for
damages against their employers, 317 a method of compensating injury to
one's person that was still available to independent individuals, but that
had never been available to dependent household members. Compensation
was also provided by means of a regulatory structure-rules created by the
state, as opposed to terms reached through bargaining and memorialized in
a private contract. The employer paid set compensation for particular
injuries-a percentage of the employee's weekly wage plus medical costs
up to a capped amount, and later a lump sum depending on the type of
injury-and in return the employee was foreclosed from other remedies.318
Additionally, to mitigate the expenses of this new scheme, employers
reduced employee wages to reflect the cost of compensation. 319 Finally,
the workers' compensation model also placed significant control of the
workplace in the hands of the employer, who now had incentives to
decrease accidental injuries by exercising managerial authority over
314. Id. at 527.
315. See, e.g., HARTOG, supra note 46, at 156.
316. ABRAHAM, supra note 131, at 55.
317. See, e.g., id. at 55.
318. Id.at56.
319. Id. at 58.
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workplace safety. As scholars have pointed out, the effect of workers'
compensation was that workers ceded control of the workplace and
accepted their lack of agency to claim additional rights, such as damages
for pain and suffering or emotional distress.320 In other words, the
employer achieved freedom from suit and increased control of the
workplace in exchange for a moderate duty of maintenance.
CONCLUSION
This Article reveals that employer liability underwent what Reva Siegel
calls "preservation through transformation."3 2 1 Siegel explains that
"[w]hen the legitimacy of a status regime is successfully contested,
lawmakers and jurists will both cede and defend status privileges-
gradually relinquishing the original rules and justificatory rhetoric of the
contested regime and finding new rules and reasons to protect such status
privileges as they choose to defend."3 22 This description is accurate in
describing the employment relationship in the context of workers'
compensation; although recast first in terms of contract and free labor and
then in terms of the family wage and production efficiency, the core power
structure of the master-servant relationship remained the same.
The master-servant relation began as a hierarchical relationship of
authoritarian benevolence and dependency, located in the household along
with the master's wife and children. Over the course of industrialization,
the relationship was refrained in the language of free will and freedom of
contract. Although employees were conceptualized as rights-bearing,
autonomous individuals, their inequality in bargaining power and the triad
of liability defenses served to absolve the employer of the master's
traditional duty of care without removing the employee's de facto
dependency. However, as the history of Massachusetts mills reveals, by
mobilizing their ambiguous status as dependent but also rights-bearing
individuals, some persistent employees were able to attain a small measure
of compensation for their injuries. Similarly, male workers were able to
draw on the rhetoric of separate spheres to portray themselves as
independent heads of their own households, even as they used this framing
to justify their dependence on their employers for increased wages. In the
final iteration of this relationship, workers were legally stripped of their
right to sue in exchange for the assurance of maintenance via a regulated
system of dependency on their employers-workers' compensation.
Under workers' compensation, the roles of the employer and the state
320. See id. at 56; Win, supra note 14, at 1499.
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were altered slightly, but not significantly. Now, as the social jurists like
Roscoe Pound had advocated, the employer's benevolence was mandated
by the state instead of discretionary, increasing the security of recovery for
workers. However, the effect of workers' compensation was to maintain a
hierarchical structure of reciprocal rights and benefits in the workplace
that largely mirrored the no-liability, duty-of-maintenance structure of the
early modern master-servant relation. This is not to say that workers did
not gain other valuable rights in the process of their transition out of the
household. The right to bodily integrity manifested in the prohibition of
chastisement is a key example. However, in the realm of employer
liability for accidental workplace injury, the fundamental structure of the
relation was preserved.
The purpose of this mapping exercise is to reveal that neither the free
labor, individualist narrative of the market, nor the hierarchical,
benevolent construction of the family, satisfactorily describes the
relationship of employers and employees reflected in the law of workers'
compensation that emerged in the early twentieth century. In this sense,
one could say that servants never truly left the household; rather, after a
century of tension and vacillation in which master-servant law adjusted to
the industrialized workplace, elements of household government were
eventually incorporated into the market. Although this Article has focused
solely on employer liability in tort, this inquiry suggests that other
elements of the employment relation, as well as the relation of the master
to other dependents like wives and children, may be understood in light of
the traditional structure of household governance. At the very least, it
challenges the common perception of the home and workplace as two
distinct spheres with segregated inhabitants and characteristics, and
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